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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
It has been estimated that there are approximately 20 million 
internally displaced persons worldwide. These are persons displaced by 
man-made rather than natural disasters. Most have fled from warfare or 
other types of violence, repression or persecution. They are called 
internally displaced persons because, unlike refugees, they remain inside 
their own countries. By region, it has been estimated that there are more 
than:
1. 9 million in Africa — principally in the Horn — in Ethiopia, Somalia 
and the Sudan; in Southern Africa — in Angola and Mozambique — 
and another 3.6 million forcibly resettled in homelands in South 
Africa;
2. 500,000 in Central America — in El Salvador, Nicaragua and 
Guatemala;
3. 4 million in Asia — in Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, Burma, Lebanon and Iraq; and
4. 500,000 in the Soviet Union.
The causes of displacement reflect the growing instability of many 
countries. In most cases, the people have been displaced by civil conflict 
or separatist wars within their country. In some cases, they have been 
forcibly resettled by their governments. These relocations are often 
carried out inhumanely and brutally by a government to break the power 
of a tribal or ethnic group. Others have been displaced because of ethnic 
strife or persecution.
The flight of the displaced to other parts of their country may fail to 
provide them with the protection they need. Often the host population 
fails to accept their presence and they may find themselves in other zones 
of conflict or highly volatile situations where they are viewed with 
mistrust by the host community. The displaced are often subjected to
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further forced relocations. Sometimes they are deliberately starved or 
food is used as a weapon to try and bring them under control.
Unfortunately, displacement is usually not temporary; the situations 
that cause displacement often go on for years without resolution.
B. DEFINITIONS
In this document, displaced persons will be defined as "individuals 
and families forced to leave their homes because of the direct or indirect 
consequences of conflict but who remain inside their country".
Displaced persons are differentiated from refugees by the fact that 
they have remained inside their country; whereas refugees are civilians 
who have sought safety by leaving their homeland and seeking asylum 
in another country.
The term "displaced person" is often used in a broader context. 
Some organizations refer to people who are forced to leave their homes 
as a result of drought or famine as displaced. Others include people who 
have been forcibly resettled by their government if the resettlement is 
ethnically, tribally or racially motivated. While each of these groups is 
in a difficult situation, this paper will only focus on people displaced by 
war or civil conflict who remain in their own country.
C. REASONS FOR CONCERN
The international humanitarian relief system has largely failed the 
displaced. The 15 million people who have crossed international borders 
generally fall under the mandate of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees or other UN agencies and receive protection and assistance. 
They are eligible to receive food, shelter and medical assistance as well 
as health, rehabilitation and training; and the UNHCR helps them to 
integrate in the country of asylum, helps them to relocate to a third 
country or facilitates their voluntary return. For the displaced, there is 
no such system. While they may flee for the same reasons as refugees, 
because they remain within the borders of their own country, they are 
not afforded the protection that refugees receive. They must look to 
their own government, not the international system, for their protection 
even in those cases when it is their own government that is the source of 
the problem. International human rights organizations and relief agencies 
are often unable to provide suitable protection or assistance. The
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obstacle of national sovereignty is one of the most formidable aspects of 
the problem.
In 1988, the United Nations General Assembly called on the 
Secretary General to study the need for the creation of an international 
mechanism to coordinate assistance programs for internally displaced 
people. In his report to the General Assembly in 1989, the Secretary 
General considered the mandates and roles of the different international 
agencies and authorized the United Nations Development Programme 
resident representatives to be the focal points for coordinating relief to 
internally displaced persons.
While relief and assistance are critical to the well-being of the 
displaced, they must also be protected from human rights abuses. Often 
these violations are overt; others are a result of government policies that 
restrict or impede assistance and relief from reaching them. To date, 
no new resolution has called for specific measures to protect the 
displaced’s human rights.
The Secretary General’s report also called for preventive measures 
and pre-emptive action to avoid displacement, including the addressing 
of "root causes". Protecting and assisting the displaced is a major 
challenge. Successful actions can reduce conflict and help lay the 
groundwork for successful reconciliation, rehabilitation and, indeed, the 
further development of the country. Inadequate attention to the problem, 
however, can prolong conflicts, make achievement of peace more 
difficult and create long-term dependencies that may be difficult to 
overcome long after the conflict.
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II. CIVIL CONFLICT
A. THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT
Conflict within a society may be created by many different factors. 
In the advanced stages of conflict, especially wars, it is often difficult to 
identify the underlying causes or motivations of the combatants. It has 
been noted, however, that wars are the sum of many individual factors, 
some of which are rather fundamental and which, if thoroughly 
understood, can provide opportunities for conflict reduction. There are 
two important things to remember. First, most conflicts are rooted in 
economic disparities. Later they may be cloaked in ideological, racial 
or even religious overtones but, at the most fundamental level, they 
represent a contest for control over economic assets, resources or 
systems.
Second, most combatants would rather not participate in the conflict. 
If given suitable alternatives and an honorable way out, most would 
choose to return to productive enterprises rather than continue to risk 
their lives.
These two factors give development agencies an opportunity to make 
a contribution to conflict reduction. By targeting development assistance 
in such a way that competition for resources is reduced and job 
opportunities are provided, it is often possible to "drain away" substantial 
numbers of people who otherwise would be drawn into the conflict. It 
is also possible to target development assistance so that it draws warring 
parties away from each other and engages them in activities which 
decrease the likelihood that they will enter the conflict.
Some of the more important causes of conflict are as follows:
1. Competition for Resources: Most conflicts are, at their most basic 
level, a competition for resources. This competition may be 
manifested in disputes over land, water rights, grazing rights, or 
jobs.
2. Ideology: Of all the causes of conflict, ideology is the most difficult 
to deal with. In most cases, however, ideology is a later 
development and is often superimposed on more basic causes as a 
justification or as a means of organizing people for a common
5
purpose. An example of an ideologically-based conflict is the war 
in El Salvador between Marxist rebels and the conservative 
government.
3. Racism: Racism, tribalism, or other manifestations of discrimination 
are key causes of conflict. Racism is difficult to temper and, in 
many cases, even after people have lived side-by-side for 
generations, a sudden spark fueled by latent racism can lead to 
violence. Generally, however, racism is superimposed over an 
economic conflict, for example in Guatemala where the economically 
dominant Ladino population is fighting to maintain hegemony over 
the more numerous indigena, or Indian, population. If all sides have 
equal access to jobs and opportunities, to land and other resources, 
conflict can be contained.
4. Religion: Religion or religious intolerance is another cause of
conflict that is difficult to address. Sometimes, religious differences 
are the fundamental cause, such as in India and Pakistan in the 
1940s. But in many cases, this too is superimposed on a more 
fundamental dispute with religion being a means of rallying people 
to one side or the other. For example, the conflict in Northern 
Ireland is often seen as a dispute between Catholics and Protestants; 
yet at a more fundamental level, the conflict there is a continuing 
struggle for economic justice and elimination of the vestiges of the 
colonial period.
5. Foreign Intervention: Many conflicts are caused by foreign
intervention. In some cases, there may be outright meddling by a 
foreign government. In others, conflict may be caused by the 
presence of foreigners (such as refugees or guerrillas operating out 
of bases or sanctuaries in the country) who create conflict as an 
adjunct to their own agendas. For example, in eastern Sudan, 
conflicts between the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) have often been carried 
out in the Eritrean refugee camps and even in the town of Kassala. 
Both parties have attempted to involve Sudanese in their dispute, and 
the increasing level of violence has created resentment against the 
refugee population. In addition, the refugees are perceived by the
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host population as competing for scarce resources, especially land, 
water and jobs, and creating strains on the society.
Foreign intervention can also fuel a conflict. For example, in 
the tribal conflict in western Darfur, the Libyan government has 
provided arms to the Arab tribes which has increased the level of 
violence and set off a small-scale arms race in the region.
6. Poverty: Poverty and injustice are major factors fuelling conflict in 
the Third World. Increasingly, conflicts are seen as a war between 
the haves and the have-nots. When people perceive that there is no 
end in sight to their economic hardship, they are likely to take up 
arms. When stuck in a quagmire of economic oppression and social 
injustice, large numbers of the poor can be enticed into taking a 
more activist stance and demanding more concessions and 
preferential assistance to alleviate economic hardships. The demand 
for bread has toppled more than one government. It is often said 
that the poorest of the poor are too poor to start a revolution, and 
that revolutions are the product of students and the middle class. 
That may be true, but it is important to recognize that, during the 
great Sahelian famine of the 1970s, every government affected by 
famine fell, more than half of them as a result of revolutions or 
military coups.
7. Cultural Conflict (Leading to Separatist Aspirations): In many cases, 
two distinct cultures find it difficult to live in harmony. If the two 
cultures live in separate and distinct geographic areas, it is not 
uncommon that aspirations for independence arise. Separatism, 
however, is usually an end-product of a failure of economic systems 
to provide equal opportunities for all citizens and the consequent 
establishment of major economic disparities between regions.
Once a conflict has reached a point where separatism is 
demanded, it is extremely difficult to resolve. For the most part, 
separatism is a futile exercise. There have been hundreds of 
separatist movements since the end of the colonial period and only 
one has been successful. That was Bangladesh, which was separated 
from Pakistan by more than a thousand miles of India, and was 
accomplished only with a full-scale invasion of the Indian forces. 
Separatist wars are virtually impossible for rebels to win for several 
reasons. First, the war will be carried out in the homeland. They
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will suffer the greatest number of deaths, economic loss and 
population displacement. Second, the national government does not 
have to pursue the war vigorously in order to win. As long as the 
government refuses to recognize the new state, it is unlikely that any 
other country will extend recognition, especially in Africa where the 
Lome convention specifies that borders established during the 
colonial period are inviolable. The inherent fear of every African 
country that it, too, could degenerate into tribal war prohibits any 
country from recognizing a separatist state breaking away from its 
neighbor. Without international recognition, no country can survive, 
for it cannot obtain hard currency, establish trading patterns, nor 
obtain vital trading capital from major donors or international 
financial institutions. For this reason, separatist wars such as the 
conflicts in Eritrea, southern Sudan and Sri Lanka, to mention but a 
few, are stalemated and will continue to be so for many years to 
come.
8. Displacement: Displacement is a major cause of conflict.
Displacement may result from a variety of factors including: 
environmental degradation; the collapse of an economy; food 
insecurity; localized conflicts over resources; and, inadvertently, the 
establishment of large-scale development projects such as dams and 
reservoirs, irrigated farming schemes, new colonization of virgin 
land, establishment of range reserves, etc. There are few large- 
scale, capital-intensive development schemes that do not create some 
degree of displacement. At a minimum, many people may be forced 
to migrate to other areas in search of work. In the worst case, 
people that are uprooted may resort to violence to resist being 
displaced or, in the case of nomads, may alter their migration routes 
around the development schemes.
It is important to recognize that one conflict will often generate 
others, especially if the original conflict is prolonged. This is due 
to several factors. Governments may become weaker and less able 
to control events in other areas and dissidents may see an opportunity 
to exploit the government’s weakness. The general proliferation of 
arms that usually accompanies conflict often leads to a breakdown of 
law and order, especially in areas adjacent to the conflict zone, and 
local grievances may flare up. Conflict may also arise from the 
migration of people and competition for resources in the areas of
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influx. Even within one conflict there may be several sub-conflicts. 
For example in Sri Lanka, the principal struggle is between the 
Hindu Tamils in the North and East and the Buddhist Sinhalese in 
the South. However, the violence in the East has also sparked a 
conflict between the Muslim population along the coast and the 
Tamils, principally over fishing rights.
It is important to try to identify the underlying causes since many 
of them may be fairly easy to resolve. For example, if a major 
cause is competition for resources, such as water or pasture, 
programming development assistance into those areas to increase the 
resource base may help to reduce tensions and the level of violence. 
This is an important role for UNDP; no other UN agency has the 
ability to help resolve conflict with development aid. Agencies like 
UNICEF and UNDRO focus on relief, i.e., food, shelter, medical 
supplies.
Sudan is an example of a country where conflict has spread to 
other areas. The principal struggle is a major civil war in the South. 
Southerners are demanding more autonomy for their people, who are 
ethnically and religiously different from the North. Table A at the 
end of this chapter lists these conflicts and identifies the underlying 
causes. While these are obviously subjective, they do indicate that 
some of the conflicts may be attenuated by the targeting of 
development aid. For example, the Darfur conflict is essentially a 
conflict arising out of competition for scarce resources. By selective 
targeting of development aid — such as improvements of pasture, use 
of range reserves and installation of additional water points — it 
should be possible to reduce conflict in the region.
Another reason for identifying the underlying causes of a conflict 
relates to resettlement planning. For example, there are proposals 
in Sudan to move large numbers of the displaced from Khartoum 
where many have sought refuge to areas outside the capital where the 
government believes there are opportunities for work. However, by 
examining the table, we can see that several areas where the 
government has proposed to send people (Damazin and Kenana) are 
already experiencing levels of conflict which could be exacerbated by 
sending additional displaced to the area.
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B. PRESSURE POINTS AND HOW TO IDENTIFY THEM
Pressure points can be defined as zones where demographic and 
economic changes are occurring, usually rapidly, that lead to possible 
conflict. These zones exhibit certain characteristics. Among the places 
where conflict can be expected are:
1. Geographic Zones Experiencing Environmental Degradation: 
Changes in habitat such as desertification, deforestation, declining 
rainfall, etc., force people to migrate in search of better land, pasture 
and water. These migrations may put pressure on resident 
populations in the areas where the migrants settle, leading to 
increased competition for available resources. This competition, if 
acute, can lead to violence.
2. Areas of Chronic Food Insecurity: Food insecurity is normally
related to available resources. If the resources are only marginal and 
periodic shortfalls in food production occur, people are forced to 
migrate in search of food or work to earn the income needed to 
procure food. Migrants often saturate local labor markets, driving 
wage scales down and creating tension between the local workers and 
the migrants.
3. Labor Poles: Labor poles, i.e., areas where large numbers of day 
laborers are employed (such as large-scale agricultural schemes) are 
often areas of tension during crisis-induced migration. Thousands of 
displaced may migrate to these areas in search of work, drastically 
lowering the wage scale and making it difficult for the resident 
workers to find work at a decent wage. In many cases, secondary 
migration occurs: either the incoming workers continue onward when 
it becomes clear that they can’t find jobs, or the resident workers are 
forced to migrate to maintain their income level. Experience has 
shown that incidents of violence may occur around these labor poles 
as people compete for increasingly fewer jobs.
4. Overpopulation: Conflict often occurs in areas that become
overpopulated as a result of migration. Overpopulation may occur 
at garrison towns where DPs may double, or even triple, the normal 
population, at villages in transition zones, or in squatter settlements
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that quickly become overpopulated with the new arrivals. Conflict 
generally breaks out because of tensions created by overcrowding or 
competition for scarce resources in the settlements, especially water.
5. Large-Scale Development Programs: Large-scale development
programs such as irrigated farming, dams and reservoirs, etc., often 
displace significant numbers of people, change the economics of an 
area or force changes in traditional migration patterns. All of these 
factors can create conflict in or around the development schemes.
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III. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
A. ROLES OF UN ORGANIZATIONS
In 1989, the Secretary General effectively designated UNDP as the 
lead agency for coordinating relief to the displaced. Formally, he 
designated the UNDP Resident Representative in his role as the UN 
Resident Coordinator to be the focal point for coordination and relief. 
In part, this reflects the growing awareness that assistance to the 
displaced requires the application of development resources to the many 
problems faced by the displaced. For example, when many DPs move 
into urban areas, the problem becomes largely an urban planning and 
economic development issue. If large numbers of the displaced remain 
in rural areas and seek work as farm laborers, agricultural development 
programs must often be expanded. While DPs often have very acute 
relief needs in the initial stages of displacement, as time goes on 
continuation of relief may not be appropriate. Furthermore, as residents 
of the country, they are entitled to development benefits and equal 
opportunities for development assistance as their fellow citizens.
To provide assistance, the UNDP Field Offices have devised a 
number of staffing models. In exceptionally large emergencies, such as 
in Ethiopia, Mozambique and the Sudan, the UN has established special 
emergency units in the UNDP offices and mandated the staff to focus 
exclusively on problems caused by the emergency. In other situations, 
the UNDP has simply created a special post for an "emergency officer" 
to advise the ResRep and prepare plans and projects in cooperation with 
the host government and the donors.
In several cases where the emergency situation has been deemed to 
be of extraordinary importance, the Secretary General has appointed a 
high level, special representative to serve as coordinator. For example, 
as a result of Operation Lifeline Sudan, the Secretary General appointed 
the head of UNICEF to initiate the program and then designated Michael 
Priestley as Assistant Secretary General and Special Representative to 
Sudan to administer the project.
In 1990, UNDP created the Office of the Emergency Coordinator at 
its headquarters in New York. The purposes of this office are largely to 
support the Field Offices with technical assistance and coordination
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support during emergencies. A large part of the work of the Emergency 
Office will be focused on displaced persons.
Other United Nations organizations that often become involved with 
displaced persons include:
1. UNICEF: Because of UNICEF’s unique mandate to assist children 
anywhere they are in need, the organization often becomes involved 
in providing assistance to the displaced in areas outside of 
government control. For example, in southern Sudan during 
Operation Lifeline Sudan, UNICEF was the principal UN 
organization responsible for assisting persons in the zones controlled 
by the insurgents; UNDP focused its attention on assisting people in 
government-controlled areas and in the garrison towns.
UNICEF may also be called on to provide assistance to displaced 
persons in government-held zones. Building on its strengths in child 
care, feeding for vulnerable groups, family reunification and the 
provision of clean water and sanitation, UNICEF is often involved 
in helping the displaced in the settlements and temporary camps 
where they have moved.
2. World Food Program: The role of the World Food Program is to 
provide food to governments or in some cases to non-governmental 
organizations assisting the displaced. If the displaced are in 
government-controlled areas, emergency food aid may be provided 
through the government channels. If, however, the people are 
residing in areas outside government control, the food will normally 
be provided through UNICEF, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross or NGOs.
WFP has established an emergency unit at its headquarters in 
Rome. This unit provides assistance to the WFP representative in 
determining emergency needs, managing international logistics and 
coordinating with donors at the international level.
3. World Health Organization: WHO is the medical and public health 
arm of the UN system. Their representatives help the local Ministry 
of Health or public health authorities to formulate and execute 
programs to ensure that the displaced receive proper medical 
attention and public health support. One of their most important 
functions is establishing epidemiological surveillance over the
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displaced population so that disease threats can be properly 
identified, detected and controlled. In Latin America and the 
Caribbean, WHO’s Pan American Health Organization has proven 
to be extremely effective in helping develop medical and health 
interventions for the displaced.
Both WHO and PAHO have established emergency sections in 
their headquarters in Geneva and Washington, respectively. These 
offices can provide technical support and information during 
emergencies.
4. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: While the 
mandate of the UNHCR does not extend to displaced persons 
specifically, it has been able to provide relief and protection in a 
number of cases, particularly when the agency has been involved in 
helping returning refugees in the same area. For example, in Sri 
Lanka in the late 1980s, UNHCR accepted responsibility for assisting 
returning displaced persons as well as refugees repatriating from 
India. When the conflict flared up in the midst of their operations, 
UNHCR continued to provide relief and other forms of assistance to 
the displaced until they were forced to withdraw their personnel from 
the conflict zone. In some cases, UNHCR has been able to extend 
assistance under a clause of its mandate which permits it to use its 
"good offices" to help persons affected by conflict at the request of 
the government of the country in which the people reside. For the 
most part, however, UNHCR does not provide extensive support or 
protection to the displaced.
5. Other UN Organizations: From time to time, other UN agencies 
may become involved in providing assistance to the displaced. For 
example, the International Labor Organization (ILO) may be called 
to develop projects to provide employment to the displaced (e.g., 
under its Special Public Works Program). The Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) has often been asked to assist the 
displaced in establishing agriculture or livestock projects to provide 
income support. Employment generation has often been studied by 
groups such as the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA) or the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP).
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B. THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS
The ICRC is mandated under international agreements to provide 
assistance to civilians in conflict zones outside of government control. 
The mandate of ICRC is both unique and specific. Its functions are 
spelled out under various Geneva accords which have been signed by the 
majority of the international community.
In order to remain neutral and even-handed, the ICRC usually 
provides assistance for non-combatants on both sides of a conflict. 
Therefore, ICRC may be operational in many of the same areas in which 
UNDP is providing assistance to the displaced in government-held areas 
and in the garrison towns.
C. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
The NGOs are often the front-line implementing agencies providing 
assistance to the displaced. NGOs are principally service agencies; i.e., 
they have certain specialties such as nutrition programs, medical care, 
social services, etc., which they can provide quickly and effectively, 
even in remote areas. NGOs are often the source of innovative 
approaches to dealing with the problems of the displaced and their 
flexibility permits them to experiment with new ideas that may be 
tailored to specific needs.
Donors such as USAID, the European Community and many 
European governments prefer to implement their programs through 
international NGOs.
D. DONORS
Several of the larger donor countries have specialized agencies that 
deal with the problems of displaced persons. For example, AID’S Office 
of US Foreign Disaster Assistance in Washington often provides funding 
and technical assistance to USAID missions to develop and support 
programs for the displaced. However, in most cases, the donors channel 
their funds through the host government, NGOs or UN system.
Donors may provide aid in the form of cash, equipment, technical 
assistance or food.
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E. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION
The IOM (formerly the Intergovernmental Committee on Migration) 
is an international organization which has become increasingly involved 
in the problems of displaced persons. Their mandate is to assist 
governments in dealing with the problems of migrations, both internal 
and international. In recent years, they have conducted a number of 
studies on the impact of crisis-induced migration and have provided 
assistance to some governments in dealing with large-scale population 
movements caused by conflict.
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IV. CAUSES AND PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT
A. CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT
The migration of people out of a zone of conflict may be triggered
by several different factors. These factors may occur independently or
simultaneously.
1. Military Operations: Ground operations by combatants are a major 
trigger to migration out of a conflict zone. Ground operations could 
include invasions of an area, military sweeps, sustained military 
occupation, foraging or widespread impressment/conscription. It 
should be noted that aerial bombing rarely causes widespread 
migration out of rural areas, although if towns or cities are attacked 
and urban dwellers have open escape routes, many may evacuate.
2. Destruction of Crops or Economic Assets: If military activities
destroy standing crops, livestock, harvested grains, or the economic 
assets of villagers on a wide scale, people in the affected area are 
likely to migrate.
3. Food Shortages: Conflict can disrupt both agricultural production 
and food marketing creating both a shortage of food and a lack of 
income for people in the food production and supply chain. As food 
shortages increase, migration will increase proportionately.
4. Collapse of Agricultural Systems: In most Third World countries, 
agricultural systems are extremely vulnerable to conflict. Conflict 
can cause a break anywhere in the production sequence, thereby 
causing a substantial reduction of output. If this production loss is 
substantial, the agricultural system can break down and create food 
shortages and, more importantly, loss of income for large numbers 
of people. When that occurs, famine is likely to break out and large 
numbers of people will be forced to migrate.
5. Collapse of the Economy: Conflict can cause the collapse of an 
economy in many ways. It can destroy or disrupt the marketing 
systems. It can destroy the economic assets of a community. It can
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push the cost of doing business to a level that destroys profitability 
for even the most basic enterprises. It can deplete the labor market. 
And it can establish a cycle of migration that strips the economy of 
both labor and purchasers. As people begin to migrate out of the 
conflict zone, businesses will gradually find the number of buyers 
declining, and, at some point, will find it unprofitable to continue; 
thus they will close their shops and, in many cases, join the 
migration stream.
B. GROUPS MOST LIKELY TO FLEE
In the initial stages of civil conflict, the people most likely to flee are 
people who live in the countryside, such as farmers, pastoralists and 
rural laborers. This is not only because armies and insurgents maneuver 
in the field, but also because cultivation is one of the enterprises most 
vulnerable to disruption by warfare. Furthermore, rural people living 
isolated on farms or in remote villages feel their vulnerability more 
acutely.
C. TYPES OF MIGRATION
Migration and conflict can be classified as sudden, precautionary, or 
economically induced.
1. Sudden Migration: Sudden migration usually occurs as the result of 
military operations. Sudden migration is often characterized by 
people fleeing out of fear when sudden, unanticipated events occur 
that force them to abandon their homes and move out of harm’s way.
2. Precautionary Evacuation: Precautionary evacuation occurs when 
people decide to move as a precaution against violence, to avoid an 
aspect of the conflict (such as conscription), or to leave while they 
can still sell their assets and evacuate in an orderly manner.
3. Economically-Induced Migration: In sustained conflicts, studies have 
shown that the majority of people leave for economic reasons. These 
factors could include substantial increases in the cost of living due to 
shortages of basic commodities, collapse of local economies, collapse
20
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of the macro-economy, the unavailability of work or alternative 
income, or the lack of buyers for goods produced.
Identifying the predominant types of migration helps to determine the 
types of resources that need to be applied at different points in the 
migration stream. For example, people who migrate suddenly as a result 
of conflict usually have few assets when they reach areas where relief 
agencies can provide assistance. Therefore, their assistance needs are 
more likely to be of an emergency nature.
People fleeing as a precaution normally have time to convert their 
assets to cash and usually require less in the way of immediate 
assistance. Furthermore, their pattern of migration will be substantially 
different from those making a sudden evacuation.
Economic migrants, too, are likely to have more assets than those 
who evacuate rapidly. However, if they have been holding out until the 
last possible moment, the relative amount of cash or convertible assets 
that they are bringing may be less than those making a precautionary 
move.
D. PATTERNS OF MIGRATION
The actual pattern and direction of migration may be influenced by 
several factors.
1. Original Location: The first factor is their original location. People 
who live on the periphery of a conflict zone are more likely to 
migrate out of the zone. In Sudan, most of the migrants coming to 
the North lived in Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Upper Nile provinces. 
People living in the southern regions such as Equatoria are more 
likely to move south, becoming refugees in Uganda or Zaire. People 
living in the central zones are more likely to move to towns. In 
short, migration routes are highly influenced by the choices 
available.
2. Seasonal Migration Patterns: Precautionary and economic migration 
tends to increase at the end of the harvest season and peak two or 
three months afterwards. At the end of the harvest, farmers 
calculate how much grain they have harvested and make a rough 
estimate of whether or not they can survive until the next crop is
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harvested (making allowances for the amount of seed that must be 
held in reserve). If they cannot survive on the amount of grain they 
have gathered, and do not have other assets such as animals that 
could be converted to cash or bartered for food, and if there are 
insufficient alternative income possibilities, such as temporary labor 
in the nearby markets, the families will be forced to migrate.
If the harvest has been marginal, cultivators may decide to 
attempt to remain in the area and see how the next harvest season 
unfolds. They will usually stay in the area until they can see if the 
climatic factors, especially rainfall, are favorable. If rains are late, 
migration will increase midway through the planting season.
3. Influences of Migration Types: People who are forced to evacuate 
suddenly generally have fewer assets and therefore tend to migrate 
in stages, first moving to an area of safety and regrouping, then to 
a nearby town in search of work. As the family accumulates assets, 
they then move on to a larger town or labor pole where they 
accumulate more assets and then begin moving on toward the larger 
cities.
People who migrate as a precaution usually tend to go farther in 
their initial move, sometimes moving directly to a labor pole or, in 
some cases, directly to the capital city.
Persons moving for economic reasons also tend to go farther in 
their initial move, depending on the amount of cash they have been 
able to generate by selling their assets.
4. Influences of Local Conflicts/Pressure Points: Migration routes, 
especially in Africa, are highly influenced by traditional rivalries and 
conflicts. For example, people of one tribe will often adjust their 
migration routes by hundreds of kilometers to avoid passing through 
an area where traditional rivals live. In areas where tribes or clans 
have a history of conflict over pastures, water or land, or where 
cattle raiding, kidnapping or village raiding has occurred, migrants 
may take great pains to avoid potential conflict zones. In some 
cases, transit routes have been established to permit nomads to pass 
through cultivated areas without incident. Migrants may follow these 
traditional routes but, if an incident occurs, conflict could spread 
quickly.
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Localized conflicts during times of drought or famine might also 
trigger migration. This occurs when people migrating from one area 
in search of more secure resources come into conflict with people 
who are settled along the migration route. Clashes between the 
migrants and the resident population can lead to displacements of 
both groups.
Conflicts can also arise in the locations where the migrations 
terminate. The migrants may bring traditional rivalries into their 
new community or conflict may develop as a result of competition 
for scarce employment opportunities. If an incident occurs, word 
will quickly spread to others who are still in the process of 
migration, and migration routes may be adjusted to avoid the 
pressure points.
E. PHASES OF DISPLACEMENT
Displacement can be broken down into five general phases: the 
preliminary phase, the evacuation/emergency phase, the migration phase, 
the settlement phase and the return phase.
1. The Preliminary Phase: During the preliminary phase, pressures 
build within the community that cause people to consider leaving 
their homes. These pressures can include insecurity, declining 
access to food (either from declining income or declining sources of 
food), loss of job opportunities, conscription, and increasing 
competition for available resources. With a general breakdown in 
law and order, localized conflict may increase.
2. The Evacuation/Emergencv Phase: There are three elements to
consider in this phase: the triggers that force a decision to evacuate, 
the evacuation itself; and the arrival of the family at a sanctuary.
A decision to evacuate can be triggered by many different events. 
Among the more common are: military activities; violence; threat of 
imminent danger; loss of a family member; loss of access to food, 
income or credit; or the imminent threat of conscription. In some 
cases, the decision may be precautionary — the head of the family 
notes the general trend of events or the gradual decline of security 
or the economy and decides that it would be better to leave while 
assets can still be converted to cash.
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In some cases, the evacuation may be stimulated by the departure 
of others (sometimes referred to as the "herd instinct") and, in some 
cases, the evacuation may be decided by others in the community, 
e.g., village elders, tribal chief or political leaders.
Moves occur at the end of a poor harvest season, if families 
recognize that they do not have enough food or other convertible 
assets to permit them to survive until the next harvest. For this 
reason, evacuation often occurs in waves with seasonal peaks.
Once a decision is made to evacuate, migrants must decide where 
and how far to go to reach a place where they will be safe. That 
point, or sanctuary, may be in a nearby town or area held by a 
friendly party in the conflict, such as a rebel-held area or, more 
commonly, a garrison town, or it may be a point outside of the 
conflict zone.
The choice of which destination to seek is often influenced by: 
the location of the nearest point of sanctuary; the escape routes that 
are open and safe; location of other family members, friends, 
relatives, clan members, tribes or language groups; the location of 
perceived income opportunities; and the location of markets where 
the breadwinners’ skills can be used.
How much consideration is given to each of these factors usually 
depends on whether or not the evacuation is precautionary, occurring 
after careful deliberation, or whether the move is sudden and 
unplanned.
The actual evacuations also follow a common pattern. In the 
case of sudden evacuations, whole families are usually forced to 
move. As long as there is an imminent threat of danger, it proceeds 
swiftly, but haltingly, with families travelling only at night, generally 
avoiding other settlements and staying off the main roads. If the 
family is walking and not using pack animals, the amount of food 
that they can carry is limited. If the distance to the sanctuary is 
long, the family’s nutritional status may decline during the 
evacuation.
If the evacuation is precautionary, the families will generally 
carry more assets and convert them to cash or food as they go along. 
The fact that they are carrying their assets may attract attacks from 
bandits along the way. For this reason, they, too, often travel only 
at night in small groups. However, if they manage to keep their
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assets as they go along, they are more likely than others to venture 
into communities along the way to sell or barter for more food.
Another characteristic of precautionary evacuations is the sending 
of breadwinners and working-age males first, then gradually bringing 
other family members out of the conflict zone.
One point should be recognized: precautionary evacuation tends 
to follow established migration routes as long as these migrations are 
uninterrupted. For example, if the evacuees have a tradition of 
migrating as seasonal agricultural laborers to areas outside the 
conflict zone, families making precautionary moves will usually 
follow the same migration routes.
The sanctuary, i.e., the first safe place that the displaced stop 
after leaving the conflict zone, is usually the first point where 
humanitarian assistance can be provided. In many cases, the people 
arriving are in terrible shape. They may be malnourished, sick and 
exhausted from their evacuation. They may have been traumatized 
by attacks upon them during their journey. And in some cases, they 
may have passed through endemic disease areas for which they had 
no resistance. Typically, large numbers of people will arrive without 
any visible assets, and families may be separated from or have lost 
family members.
In these conditions, emergency assistance and relief are required. 
Typically, large percentages of the people will accumulate around a 
health post, a water point or other rallying place, and a camp will 
evolve.
Some of the new arrivals may be able to find work in nearby 
towns or on local farms, especially if resident farmers have a 
tradition of employing migrant labor or establishing temporary 
sharecropping relationships.
Operationally, the emergency phase can generally be said to last 
as long as there are new arrivals into the sanctuary and as long as 
malnutrition, morbidity and mortality rates are above normal. From 
the migrants point of view, however, the emergency phase lasts 
either until they can be assured that their families can live on the 
assistance being provided or they have accumulated enough resources 
to move on to an area where they can find steady employment. In 
the initial stages of a conflict, it may be possible for the early 
arrivals to find employment opportunities near the sanctuary. But 
soon, these openings will be taken and the job market saturated to a
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point where the wage scale is sufficiently depressed so that 
subsequent arrivals must move outward in search of jobs and 
income. It can thus be said that the emergency phase ends when 
onward migration begins.
3. The Migration Phase: At the point where people begin moving out 
of the sanctuary, the pattern of movement quickly develops the 
characteristics of normal, though accelerated, migration. The 
ultimate destination for many of the people will be the large cities or 
capital of the country. In the early years of these migrations, much 
of the flow of people from the sanctuaries towards the cities will be 
segmented. In other words, people will stop as soon as they are able 
to secure adequate income possibilities. Close to the sanctuary, 
spontaneous settlement in nearby villages and or on farms will occur. 
But progressively, as each labor market becomes saturated, 
subsequent arrivals must move further "up the line".
In many countries, there are large labor poles such as 
mechanized farming schemes, large-scale irrigated agricultural 
schemes or industries such as mines that can employ large numbers 
of additional short-term laborers. Thus, much of the migration will 
be towards these labor poles. However, as they too become 
saturated and wage scales begin to decline, more and more families 
will go directly to the urban centers.
At the labor poles, the influx of new and cheap labor may force 
many of the earlier arrivals to quit the area and move on towards the 
urban centers. This secondary displacement is a major cause of 
conflict in these areas.
In the early years, migration is likely to be more segmented with 
migrants dropping out of the stream as it progresses toward the 
cities. In the later stages there is less segmentation, with people 
moving greater distances in their first move with many going directly 
to the cities without an intermediary stop. Later migrations are 
probably also influenced by the fact that the earlier migrants will 
have already established themselves in the cities and, therefore, the 
new migrants can expect some support when they first arrive.
4. The Settlement Phase: When migrants reach a destination where 
they can remain without expectation or fear of having to move 
onward, the settlement phase begins. (Some observers claim that the
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settlement phase begins when people begin to build a shelter that is 
more or less permanent.) In towns and cities, most migrants tend to 
move into squatter settlements located in the marginal areas of the 
city environs, or on the periphery of the metropolitan area. 
Outwardly, these settlements are indistinguishable from other squatter 
settlements and, indeed, many of the displaced may move into areas 
where other migrants, not displaced by conflict, have already settled. 
One characteristic, however, should be noted. That is, the displaced 
tend to move to areas where they have friends, relatives or clansmen. 
In Sudan, for example, many of the settlements in Khartoum with a 
high percentage of displaced persons closely resemble the ethnic 
make-ups of the areas from which the people fled. It is not 
uncommon, for example, to find Dinka and Nuer living in the same 
settlements. Further analysis shows that many migrants reconstitute 
their village structure in the urban settlements.
Many agencies treat the arrival of DPs in a city as an 
emergency, often setting up programs to provide food, medical 
attention and other types of assistance generally classified as relief. 
With but a few exceptions, these new urban migrants are generally 
indistinguishable from other urban settlers and they quickly 
assimilate. For this reason, it may be wrong to approach the arrival 
of the displaced as an emergency problem beyond a certain point.
The one cause of concern that distinguishes displaced persons 
from other urban migrants is the high infant mortality rate that this 
group experiences during the first six months after their arrival in the 
cities. This is particularly pronounced during the later years of 
crisis-induced migration when the process of migration is less 
segmented. Studies of Khartoum, for example, noted that the infant 
mortality rate of newly displaced was four times higher than that of 
other urban migrants arriving at the same time, and was almost ten 
times higher than the infant mortality rates of people who had lived 
in the same squatter settlement for one year or more. For this 
reason, intervention soon after families have arrived is required, 
although the type of intervention should generally be immediate 
economic assistance rather than traditional relief. If people can 
obtain income and employment, they will generally be able to take 
care of their own health and food needs.
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5. The Return Phase: As in any migration, a certain number of people 
will return when conditions permit. When and how many will return 
are dependent on many factors including the relative degree of 
security in the people’s homeland, the amount of time between the 
original displacement and the time when a return is possible, the 
level of indebtedness incurred by families desiring to return, and the 
availability of work and income-generating possibilities in the place 
of origin.
Because crisis-induced migration is virtually indistinguishable 
from other rural-to-urban migration patterns, it is unlikely that large 
numbers of people who formerly lived in rural areas will ever return, 
even if a full settlement of the conflict is achieved. For example, 
following the 1972 Addis agreement ending the Anyanya war in 
southern Sudan, there was only a five percent increase in population 
during the first year of the cease fire. Many of those may have been 
refugees returning from Uganda. There is very little evidence that 
substantial numbers of Southerners who fled to the North returned 
to the South.
The one group of migrants who are most likely to return are 
former urban dwellers in the conflict areas. Merchants, white-collar 
workers, teachers and government officials are generally more likely 
to return if a settlement can be achieved.
It is important to recognize that a certain amount of spontaneous 
return occurs during lulls in the conflict. Few studies have been 
done about these spontaneous returns, but it is likely that they 
resemble patterns of spontaneous repatriation of refugees. In those 
cases, studies have shown that:
• the persons most likely to repatriate are those living closest to 
the border. Translated into crisis migration terms, people living 
in or near the transition zone and in garrison towns are those 
most likely to return. This is because they will be better able to 
maintain contacts in their original communities, and they will be 
aware more quickly of opportunities to return safely.
• people who have retained rural agricultural skills are the most 
likely to return during ongoing conflicts because they fear loss 
of their land.
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• spontaneous returns may be influenced by an inability to move 
to other areas due to lack of capital, lack of job opportunities, or 
lack of a support structure in other communities. In other 
words, the best option is to return.
F. SECONDARY DISPLACEMENT
Migration that results from civil or separatist wars may create 
pressures that expand the conflict and produce areas of tension that can 
erupt into localized conflicts. This is due to several factors. First, as 
mentioned earlier, the displaced may establish a smaller version of their 
society in the cities, bringing with it all the inherent conflicts.
Second, the movement of people from one zone to another can 
increase competition for available resources and lead to resentment 
against the newcomers by the host population.
Third, the arrival of large numbers of unskilled workers in a labor 
market serves to depress wages and causes resentment among local 
workers.
Fourth, new migrants can increase pressures on available services 
and infrastructure. For example, in many communities, large numbers 
of new migrants may lower the average amount of water available to a 
village or settlement.
In reviewing the entire phenomenon of crisis-induced migration, it 
is important to recognize and attempt to identify the points of conflict 
that may arise.
G. MIGRATION AS A PRESSURE-RELIEF MECHANISM
It is often difficult to predict when displacement will occur and what 
type or pattern of migration will follow. Even when all the indications 
are present, populations may remain in place longer than anticipated. 
This has led some observers (Cuny, et al) to theorize that crisis-induced 
displacement is largely a self-regulating pressure-relief mechanism. In 
other words, out-migration of people during periods of stress often 
relieves or eases the pressures that force migration. For example, in 
conflicts that are created as a result of competition for resources, out­
migration of substantial numbers of people reduces the competition for 
those resources and thereby lowers the level of conflict.
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H. PATTERNS OF MOVEMENT
For the majority of displaced persons, movements of individual 
families can best be characterized as sequential or as following a 
"stepping stone" pattern.
For victims of violence, the first move is usually into the bush. 
Families may flee into areas near their homes where they can hide in 
relative safety and where members of the family separated by the 
violence can regroup. How long they remain in these bush settlements 
is usually a function of the presence and movement of combatants. If 
combatants remain in the area, the family will only pause long enough 
to regroup, acquire some supplies, and then move on. When the 
combatants withdraw, the family may choose to remain for a period of 
time to test whether or not they can return home. If it becomes apparent 
that the family cannot return in safety, they will move to a new area in 
search of sanctuary.
The next stop is normally a town or a small city. Who controls the 
town is not usually as important a factor in their choice as the likelihood 
that food and relief supplies will be available. The displaced often feel 
that towns are less violent than rural areas. They also know that relief 
systems will operate close to major communications links. Since a 
government must keep communications open to its administrative centers 
and ultimately has a greater capacity to feed people, families are more 
likely to head to the cities controlled by the government than to areas 
held by insurgents. In other words, no matter what political sympathies 
are held by the people, they instinctively feel that their best chance of 
survival is in government-held towns.
Whether or not the displaced remain in the town of first refuge is a 
function of two factors:
• the ability of the community to absorb the migrants and offer them
at least minimal jobs and services; and
• the amount of relief that can be provided by government authorities.
There are no hard and fast rules about what rate or percentage of 
increase can be sustained by a community before subsequent arrivals 
must go elsewhere. In El Salvador in 1984, it was observed that 
displaced populations in the smaller towns tended to hover at about 15
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percent of the normal population and did not increase above this level 
until relief supplies were provided by the government. At that point, the 
population in some towns grew to 50 percent or more of the original 
population. (At the same time, in the capital and larger cities, the influx 
of displaced persons swelled those populations from 75 to 125 percent 
above normal.)
While there are no corresponding studies of displaced African 
societies, it is clear that, if relief assistance is minimal in the towns 
nearest the conflict, families must move on to larger cities where broader 
economies promise a higher likelihood of jobs and resources to support 
them. As populations swell in the regional centers, DPs who arrived 
earlier may fear that the increase in new arrivals represents a reduction 
of the support available for their own families. Therefore, as soon as 
they can acquire the resources, they often decide to move on to larger 
cities. This process may be carried out in stages, with the breadwinner 
and older males leaving first; only if time and circumstances permit 
planning and accumulation of ample resources to make the journey will 
the entire family leave together. The sending of breadwinners and males 
to the cities first is another contributing factor to the high percentage of 
women and children in the regional centers.
It is clear that, if a government wants to contain the displaced outside 
the capital, it must focus its efforts on the regional centers and camps 
near the towns of first refuge.
I. SETTLEMENT PATTERNS
Because relief programs for displaced persons tend to focus on the 
areas in which they reside, it is important to understand the 
characteristics of the settlement types usually encountered. In general, 
there are three physical settlement patterns: camps, spontaneous 
settlements, and pockets within existing squatter settlements.
1. Camps: Sometimes referred to as welfare centers, relief camps or 
distribution centers, emergency camps for the displaced are normally 
those locations where relief supplies are distributed and which 
become the focal point for the delivery of emergency services to 
persons in the first stages of displacement. These camps can vary in 
size from several dozen families to many thousands. Their growth 
will ultimately be decided on the basis of the amount of assistance
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that can be provided to sustain the population, the security of the 
area, and government policies relating to the size of the camps.
Assistance in camps generally follows the same lines as 
assistance in refugee camps. A full range of food, shelter and health 
programs needs to be provided along with water, sanitation and other 
site improvements.
Governments often try to contain displaced persons exclusively 
in camps. In these cases, caution should be exercised, for such 
restrictions necessitate an escalation in the levels of service that must 
be provided. Since camps are normally in more remote locations, 
assistance will probably require substantial transport investment and 
result in higher per capita costs. The only way to keep costs 
manageable is to permit DPs to work and participate in the local 
economy to the greatest extent possible.
2. Spontaneous DP Settlements: Spontaneous settlements composed 
entirely of displaced persons quite often spring up around towns and 
cities. People with similar ethnic, linguistic or cultural backgrounds 
to the displaced are often located in smaller towns close to the area 
of origin; thus, spontaneous settlements may form an extension of an 
existing community. The primary difference between a new 
spontaneous settlement and an existing squatter settlement may be in 
the quality of shelter. Since the displaced initially have neither the 
resources nor the interest in making a permanent investment in 
shelter, these settlements can become overcrowded slums unless the 
government and relief agencies act quickly. Once people have 
settled, it is very difficult to re-plot the site in order to add basic 
services and provide sufficient land for reasonable population 
densities. Thus, once the government recognizes that spontaneous 
settlement is likely to occur, sites of the government’s choice where 
services can be provided cheaply and equitably should be identified 
and development plans made so that a settlement can grow along 
orderly and cost-efficient lines.
In larger cities, where the majority population is culturally or 
linguistically different from the displaced population, spontaneous 
settlements may be established near to, but not contiguous with, the 
urban area. This pattern provides protection from the larger 
population. Over a period of years, normal growth of the urban area 
may fill in the territory between the city and the spontaneous
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settlement; however, the spontaneous settlement is likely to remain 
a ghetto, culturally distinct from the surrounding population.
3. Pockets Within Squatter Settlements: If a government demonstrates 
hostility towards the displaced, they are likely to try to integrate into 
existing squatter settlements, making it more difficult for authorities 
to locate them. Most squatter settlements are considered illegal by 
the authorities, but the mere fact that they exist demonstrates that a 
government is powerless to prevent their development. By grafting 
onto these settlements, some degree of solidarity can be achieved — 
if not overtly, at least subtly. If the government upgrades the 
facilities in the settlement, the displaced benefit along with all the 
rest of the residents. On the other hand, actions detrimental to the 
displaced may be perceived as a threat to the non-displaced 
population who, in self-defense, may unite with the displaced against 
the government actions.
DPs who have integrated into squatter settlements are often the 
most difficult group to assist. Consequently, they often experience 
high malnutrition rates, especially children under five years of age. 
In a 1984 survey of squatter settlements with high proportions of 
displaced persons in the capital of El Salvador, surveyors found the 
gross malnutrition rate as measured by middle-upper-arm 
circumference (MUAC) to be around 7 percent. However, when 
DPs were isolated within the same communities, the malnutrition rate 
for their children proved to be 27 percent.
The lesson is that, in determining overall priorities of assistance, 
it is important to identify specific population groups so that aid may 
be properly targeted. It must also be recognized that targeting is 
extremely difficult, as it is socially and politically disruptive to 
provide food and other services for the displaced and not for other 
low-income families residing within the larger community. It can be 
argued that provision of comprehensive assistance to both populations 
within the same geographic area would have many positive political 
benefits for the government. Unfortunately, the resources to sustain 
such an operation are usually unavailable.
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V. ASSISTANCE
A. PROTECTION AND SECURITY
Displaced persons must often be protected from serious human rights 
violations. At present, no international organization has been given a 
mandate to do this and there is no adequate international system in place 
to provide protection. Thus, the displaced must look to their own 
government, not the international community, for protection and security. 
This can be problematic for it is often their own government that is the 
source of the problem. In other cases, the government may not have the 
resources or ability to protect and assist them. While the UN 
coordinator has a mandate to provide relief and assistance, it has neither 
the mandate, the resources nor the competence to provide protection or 
security. Furthermore, UNDP often runs into major problems in gaining 
access to those in need, principally because the host government places 
administrative obstacles in the way.
As a result of these obstacles, the UN must rely on an ad hoc 
protection system. A common principal strategy is placing as many 
international agencies as possible in the areas where the problems are 
occurring. It has been demonstrated that the presence of international 
agencies serves to reduce the incidence of human rights abuses. In cases 
where UN peacekeeping forces are engaged, it is often possible to 
coordinate humanitarian assistance with peacekeeping operations.
The press can be a powerful ally in helping to reduce protection 
problems. Few countries want the adverse publicity that the media can 
focus on human rights abuses. Countries with gross human rights 
violations have difficulty obtaining the international credit and 
development resources that are needed for development programs.
The threat of aid termination is often proposed as a means of 
reducing government human rights abuses. But experience has shown 
that this threat has rarely been carried out. Generally UNDP staff must 
work quietly behind the scenes to bring the government into compliance 
with international standards on the issue. But these quiet efforts must 
also be strong and carried out in concert with other major donors.
Operational difficulties include lack of coordination, the use of ad 
hoc approaches, obstacles created by governments, and the issue of 
national sovereignty. In many cases, the UNDP has little leverage since
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it is reluctant to use the cancellation of development aid as a threat. It 
is clear that many governments have recognized that donors can be 
manipulated. UNDP is particularly vulnerable because of its role as a 
servant of the member state. Thus, UNDP must be careful not to be 
drawn into an adversarial relationship with the government and must 
continually strive to find ways to reinforce and build on the positive steps 
that governments may take to reduce tensions and facilitate operations. 
Nonetheless, the United Nations has a higher moral responsibility: it 
represents the collective moral force of the world community. Actions 
must never be taken that legitimize a government’s ill behavior towards 
its citizens, or denial of any of their rights guaranteed under the UN’s 
Declaration on the Rights of Man.
B. ASSISTANCE NEEDS
The displacement and movement of civilians during an internal war 
is often viewed by international humanitarian agencies as principally an 
emergency management problem. Many organizations that specialize in 
refugee assistance have become involved in emergency assistance to the 
displaced. For this reason, they tend to view displacement as a "refugee- 
like" problem. While many of the initial requirements of the displaced 
are similar to those of refugees (especially protection and certain 
emergency services), beyond a certain point the problem requires a very 
different set of strategies and approaches. The emergency phase is rather 
short and usually confined to a relatively small geographic zone. Beyond 
the emergency phase, displacement soon becomes a migration issue. 
Conflict propels and accelerates ongoing migration, especially internal 
migration towards cities and transmigration between regions. In many 
cases, these migration patterns are further aggravated because of 
economic collapse caused by the conflict. Thus, one of the ways to view 
displacement should be from a migration perspective.
Displacement is both more fluid and complex. If we approach the 
problem only from an emergency services perspective, we neglect many 
long-term needs where development approaches and programs can be 
applied. Furthermore, if we continue to apply emergency relief beyond 
a certain point, we run the danger of creating dependencies and 
establishing inequities in the communities where the displaced take up 
residence. This, in turn, creates local resentments, elevates tensions and 
possibly sparks localized conflicts.
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Perhaps a better term to describe the process of displacement is 
"crisis-induced migration". Addressing the entire phenomenon as a 
whole, then breaking it into its parts, permits agencies to use 
development assistance and approaches to prevent and reduce conflict, 
as well as to provide long-term assistance.
Assistance needs change as each phase changes, and within each 
phase needs may change over time.
Generally, emergency assistance is necessary during the preliminary 
and evacuation phases, but more developmental assistance is required in 
the migration and settlement phases. In the return phase, a combination 
of transport and reconstruction assistance is required.
1. Assistance in the Preliminary Phase: During the preliminary phase, 
if it is possible to reach the affected area, it may be possible to 
provide assistance in such a way that displacement can either be 
prevented or limited. For example, if displacement will result from 
food insecurity or lack of income to procure food, a combination of 
short-term work programs to provide jobs and income along with 
various types of food aid may provide enough support so that people 
will not be forced to leave their homes.
If potential displacement will result from localized conflict, such 
as that arising out of a competition for resources, increasing the 
resource base with development aid may serve to dampen the conflict 
or at least contain it. For example, conflict may arise out of access 
to water. By increasing the number of water points in the competing 
communities, conflict could be reduced.
International agencies might also be able to help by providing 
protection or by serving to adjudicate or mediate local disputes. 
Sometimes, the presence of outsiders can temper an escalating crisis.
For the most part, assistance needs can be categorized as 
economic assistance or projects designed to increase food security.
2. Assistance Needs During the Emergencv/Evacuation Phase: Once 
people have started to move, it is imperative that their emergency 
needs are met as soon as they reach sanctuary. These needs typically 
include food, nutritional rehabilitation, medical and public health 
assistance, water and possibly protection. Relief agencies can expect 
the majority of the displaced in the worst condition to congregate in 
relief camps.
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Mi.f uation Phase: Durin§ ^  early stages of migration, assistance 
will be needed to support smaller communities that are impacted by 
a high rate of spontaneous settlement, and assistance will need to be 
provided in and around labor poles. Since the migrants will 
immediately increase competition for resources and jobs, assistance 
strategies should focus on providing additional work and income- 
earning opportunities. Projects to increase water supplies where 
there is scarcity, especially during times of drought or during the dry 
season, should be given priority. Increasing access to health services 
and educational facilities may also help the migrants assimilate into 
then new communities. It should be cautioned that the displaced 
should not be singled out for assistance. Rather, assistance should
be provided to the entire community, i.e., "whole village" strategies 
should be used.
During the migration phase, it is also important that assisting 
agencies pursue a range of conflict-reduction strategies. By 
identifying likely pressure points and monitoring situations to detect 
rising tensions, agencies can often use development aid to limit or 
contain local conflicts that are caused by migration and rapid 
population changes.
4. Settlement Phase: Once migrants have reached their destination and 
ave begun settling into their new communities, assistance should be 
provided to help them assimilate and find adequate sustained 
employment to help them take care of their own needs. Typically 
t e types of assistance and inputs that people need are:
• land;
• credit; and
extension of municipal services (water, sanitation, roads, etc.).
In larger urban areas where migrants settle in squatter settlements 
programs to upgrade the living environment through improvement of 
living conditions can provide great benefit not only to the 
newcomers, but to the municipality in general.
If the rate of influx to urban areas is unchecked and continuous 
i may be necessary to investigate the possibility of providing sites 
and services programs on a large scale. Sites and services programs 
are projects to rationally develop tracts of land for urban migrants.
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Land, serviced by water, roads, electricity, etc., is provided on long­
term tenure arrangements and assistance is provided to people to 
build their own homes on the allocated land.
As mentioned earlier, there might also be a need to provide 
immediate assistance to newcomers to help reduce the high infant 
mortality rates that accompany their arrival in urban zones.
5. Assistance Needs During the Return Phase: When families indicate 
that they are willing to return to their original homes, assistance 
agencies might wish to encourage that return by providing support. 
This may include return transport, short-term financial assistance and 
possibly food aid.
Once the families have returned to their area, general 
reconstruction assistance should be provided. This may include: 
credit, provision of tools or inputs, housing reconstruction aid, etc. 
There might also be a need to assist families in reacquiring title or 
access to lands that they have abandoned.
Crisis-induced migration may have separated families and 
scattered various family members to different parts of the country. 
Therefore, it is often necessary to help establish tracing services and 
family reunification programs. It is generally fairly easy for adults 
to locate other adults, but if families have been separated from their 
children, outside assistance can be extremely helpful.
C. VULNERABLE GROUPS
As in most crisis situations, the persons most vulnerable to disease 
and death are women and small children. In the emergency phases, 
women and children often receive less food than other members of a 
family and, therefore, are more likely to be malnourished by the time 
they come into the assistance system. Small children are more 
susceptible to diseases, especially if they were living on isolated farms 
with little contact with others who might have carried communicable 
diseases. The combination of undernutrition and exposure to disease 
makes children under five years of age very vulnerable.
It has also been observed that the displaced experience very high 
infant mortality rates in the first six months after they arrive in cities, 
especially when they are living in squatter settlements. This is probably 
because it takes some time for the family to begin to earn enough money
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to buy all the food that they need and because drinking water in many of 
these settlements is of poor quality, leading to high rates of diarrhea.
Women are often vulnerable not only to disease but to exploitation 
and sexual harassment, especially if no adult male from their family is 
present. Camps for displaced persons often attract the worst kind of 
attention from nearby communities and the numbers of incidents of rape, 
beating and kidnapping are often high. To some extent, this can be 
reduced by expanding the number of staff in settlements with a high 
portion of single women, providing proper lighting and avoiding 
settlement designs or layouts that create dark, remote areas where 
incidents can easily take place. Without strong support from the local 
government and security forces, however, it will be difficult to stop.
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VI. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
Assisting displaced persons is one of the most politically sensitive 
activities carried out by the UNDP. In cases where the government is 
one of the parties in a civil conflict, UNDP is often placed in the difficult 
position of having to deal with government agencies who are reluctant to 
provide assistance to people whom they consider "enemies". In many 
cases, government actions or policies may be root causes of the conflict.
The fact that the UN must provide assistance through the host 
government often leads to charges that the UN is not a neutral agency. 
Many liberation groups mistrust the UNDP and most donors and NGOs 
find the UN’s position frustrating. Unfortunately, this is a working 
reality. When the UN is involved, humanitarian assistance can only be 
provided within certain limits. However, those limits can be quite broad 
and UNDP has a major role to play in humanitarian operations which 
cannot be discounted. In any assistance program for the displaced, all 
UN staff must clearly understand what these limits are and how to 
operate effectively within the constraints.
It should be remembered that usually the majority of assistance 
provided to displaced persons is from the government side since most of 
the displaced migrate to government-controlled areas. This is for a 
variety of reasons (normal migration routes, family ties, linguistic 
reasons, etc.). The main reason, however, is that people move towards 
viable economies, i.e., where the best opportunities for jobs are found. 
Displacement is as much an economic survival strategy as flight from 
conflict. The displaced must earn a living; they cannot rely on 
international relief and they must go where the economy is functioning. 
The fact that they are familiar and comfortable with, and have a right to 
participate in, the national economy is the reason they come to the 
government’s side. They are not, as is often claimed, making a political 
statement or choosing one side over the other. Thus, despite constraints 
on the UN during conflicts, the scale of the population that the UN can 
assist can be quite large and UNDP should always be seen as a key actor 
in the overall assistance framework.
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B. LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES
It is often difficult to reach the displaced with assistance. In many 
cases, they reside in remote areas where access is difficult and 
transportation may be poor. The topography may be rugged and 
seasonable rains may make surface transportation hazardous and difficult. 
In the conflict zone, security conditions may prohibit or severely restrict 
travel. In areas adjacent to the conflict zone, security conditions may be 
marginal at best, especially for the displaced.
In these situations, full attention must be given to advance planning. 
It will often be necessary to stockpile supplies in, or near, the areas 
where the displaced are going so that shortages do not occur during times 
when the areas are isolated by conflict or climatic conditions.
In some cases, the UN may have to rely on extraordinary means of 
transport. Garrison towns may have to be supplied by aircraft and on­
site management may also require the use of small planes to move 
quickly over vast areas where needs can change instantaneously. 
Emergency operations are often said to require planning in three 
dimensions: air, land and sea. However, operations planners should be 
aware that long-range relief operations, especially when aircraft are 
involved, are extremely expensive. Emphasis should be placed on 
procuring as many relief supplies as possible from local or nearby 
sources. It is often possible to use a broad range of market interventions 
that can have the same results as bringing large amounts of relief 
supplies from outside the affected area.
C. "STRUCTURAL" PROBLEMS
Many relief workers talk about the "international relief system". 
However, no one system exists. Rather, there are groups of 
organizations that provide different types of assistance at different levels. 
In any situation, these groups may band together formally or informally 
to provide relief to the displaced. Some organizations act in the capacity 
of fund raisers; others act as donors. Some provide funds directly to the 
displaced while others provide funds to other agencies that will help the 
displaced.
Within this ad hoc structure, there are many difficulties. NGOs are 
often seen as the primary operating agencies in emergencies. While 
many agencies have excellent capabilities, most can only provide a fairly
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limited range of services. Many of the most important areas where lives 
can be saved are overlooked. For example, only a handful of agencies 
have the capability of providing assistance in the sectors of water and 
sanitation. Few agencies are experienced in setting up and maintaining 
the "heavy" logistics system required for providing massive food aid and, 
within the international community, no agency is specifically tasked with 
providing protection or security to the displaced.
Once the displaced are no longer in an emergency situation, few 
agencies are in a position to provide assistance to help the people 
integrate into their new communities and provide the necessary jobs, 
education and temporary support to enable them to begin to take care of 
their own needs.
Because of these "structural" deficiencies in the relief system, UNDP 
often must plug the gaps by arranging for the necessary services either 
from the host government or NGOs.
The international assistance system is vastly overstretched. The 
needs have grown far beyond the capability of international agencies to 
meet all requirements. Experienced personnel are often drawn from one 
operation to another before their present contracts are complete. For this 
reason, UNDP should focus its attention on building up cadres of 
national emergency management personnel, both inside the government 
and in the private sector, so that the sudden transfer of international 
personnel will not disrupt an ongoing program.
D. COORDINATION
Coordination is one of the principal roles of the UNDP in assisting 
displaced persons. Effective coordination is critical, yet it is often 
difficult to achieve. Coordination requires more than periodic meetings; 
it requires:
1. Agreement about standard approaches to specific problems;
2. Comprehensive strategies that provide an integrated framework 
building on the strengths of the different agencies; and
3. An overall conceptual framework, or "vision", of what is needed 
(i.e., all agencies should be moving towards a common goal).
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Due to the nature of a conflict, it is often difficult to get many 
organizations to share information about their activities. Organizations 
that have ties to insurgents or who are working with DPs in countries 
where the government has demonstrated its hostility to the displaced 
often fear that sharing information with the UN will compromise their 
work or even lead to harm for the people. It is important that UN 
coordinators respect the confidentiality of information and ensure that 
sensitive data does not fall into the wrong hands.
E. REACHING PEOPLE IN CONFLICT ZONES
Many of the displaced may remain in the areas of conflict. In recent 
years, donors and relief agencies have shown an increasing willingness 
to run the risk of providing assistance to people in those areas. Agencies 
have begun to realize that the people are usually better off remaining in 
or near their homes where they can remain at least partially self- 
sufficient. The nature of long-term, low-intensity civil wars often 
permits people to stay with an acceptable level of risk and, in many 
cases, the people are safer in rebel-held areas than if they were to flee 
to government-held zones. UNDP has recently been involved in helping 
to arrange corridors through which relief aid can pass unmolested 
(Angola, Ethiopia and Sudan), establishing temporary cease fires so that 
civilians can be assisted (El Salvador) and establishing cross-line feeding 
programs where people can come into government-held areas, obtain the 
assistance they need and take it back to their villages in the conflict zone 
(Ethiopia).
F. DEALING WITH LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
A major constraint in helping people in rebel-held areas is that 
organizations must deal with an anti-government group. Officially, the 
United Nations can only do so with the concurrence of the government. 
This means that many opportunities to help people caught in critical 
situations are lost. In some cases, it is possible to get the government’s 
agreement to make limited contact with the insurgents. While the 
government may not be comfortable with these arrangements, there are 
advantages to them which they recognize. With patience, it should be 
possible to establish a wide range of contacts, either directly or 
indirectly, with rebel groups even in the midst of intensive military
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campaigns. Over time, it may be possible to negotiate point-by-point 
agreements of what can and cannot be done in areas that rebels control, 
or in which they are operating, which will permit the UN to provide or 
support assistance in contested areas. It is important, however, to take 
special care that projects launched from the government side are not co­
opted as pacification efforts or come to be viewed by the rebels as 
supporting pacification. The specific modalities of working with rebel 
groups, or their supporters, must be undertaken with utmost care and 
every effort must be made to ensure that all sides approve specific 
projects or activities.
G. AVOIDING PACIFICATION
A number of programs styled as assistance to displaced persons are 
actually pacification programs. These include:
1. Relocation projects designed to resettle the rebels popular 
support base;
2. Programs designed to force neutral peasants to choose sides (i.e., 
the government’s side), or to establish effective control over 
populations for military or security purposes.
Pacification programs are especially prevalent in Central America. 
Many relief organizations participate in these projects without 
understanding the broader issues and implications. Providing 
development assistance in a way that encourages new settlement patterns 
or resettlement has many political connotations and must be approached 
carefully.
The nature of assistance determines if the program is promoting 
pacification. Relief aid designed to create dependencies and hold people 
in camps may have different implications in different situations. Relief 
officials must be very careful in formulating projects and try to 
understand all the issues that are involved. This is not to say that long­
term assistance of a developmental nature should not be provided. 
However, when governments begin planning alternative housing, new 
urban development, "peace villages", etc., UNDP staff should be alert 
to the implications and recognize that they are getting into very sensitive 
areas.
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H. LIMITATIONS OF NGOs
NGOs currently play a key role in providing assistance to the 
displaced, especially during the emergency period. Using NGOs to 
provide assistance offers many operational advantages. They can be 
flexible and innovative in their programs. They are less bureaucratic and 
generally can move quickly if funds are available. However, there are 
some disadvantages.
Host governments often consider NGOs a nuisance. In many 
countries, governments are beginning to restrict NGOs and limit their 
access to the displaced. Many assistance programs have faltered because 
governments have restricted NGO operations. In the role of coordinator, 
UNDP must develop ways to support NGOs in the field. At the same 
time, it is important to develop alternative approaches that can be 
activated in case international NGOs are prevented from providing 
services.
NGOs are also limited in the amount of services they can provide 
and the number of people they can support. As the number of displaced 
increase and the problem changes from an emergency to more of a 
migration problem, the NGOs role typically diminishes. They are 
generally not effective in dealing with the problems of population 
movements or providing services in settlements or urban environments.
In a post-conflict period, NGOs again have a reduced role. Initially, 
they facilitate the return of families to their homes and provide assistance 
to returnees. However, reconstruction programs are generally the 
domain of the international financial institutions and the bilateral donors 
working through the host government. In the reconstruction program in 
Sri Lanka, total NGO resources amounted to less than 1 % of the total 
funding.
I. APPROPRIATENESS OF AID
As in other fields of emergency assistance, examples can be found 
of inappropriate aid being provided to displaced persons. Inappropriate 
aid may be a symptom of an overall problem, i.e., a lack of 
understanding of the processes at play. Most agencies tend to focus on 
the emergency period and treat displacement as if it were a refugee-like 
situation. Thus, most of the aid provided is classified as relief rather 
than longer-term development assistance. In the emergency period, or
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for those remaining in the conflict zone, relief may be appropriate; 
however, emergency aid should be time-limited and efforts should be 
made to provide development assistance to people and to the communities 
where they take up residence as quickly as possible.
Many observers have pointed to the conflict between relief and 
development aid and have suggested that the distinction between the two 
be eliminated. Broader strategies that can reach people in the various 
kinds of settlements and the variety of situations in which they are found 
should be considered.
J. TARGETING AID
In most emergency situations, donors and relief agencies tend to 
divide the beneficiaries into categories according to priorities of need. 
For example, agencies often focus on the people considered most 
vulnerable such as women and children under five. Even assisting the 
displaced in general tends to single them out from the rest of the 
population. This can create resentment and animosity in communities 
where the displaced are unwelcome and where they are seen to be 
competing with the local population for scarce resources such as water, 
food and jobs. In order to relieve tensions, it is important that UNDP 
quickly program development support to the impacted communities, not 
just to the displaced. This is a key role for UNDP. Few other agencies 
have the ability to provide the large-scale development aid that is 
required. This is known as the "whole community" approach.
K. COST OF ASSISTANCE
The provision of integrated assistance packages to displaced persons 
is expensive. Costs are especially high when the displaced move to cities 
and assistance essentially becomes urban development. When the 
displaced move into existing squatter settlements, it is difficult to ignore 
the people already there who may have the same basic needs. This 
means that UNDP must develop broad, popular-based approaches and put 
greater emphasis on programs that utilize the people’s own resources to 
improve their condition. As situations become static, it is important to 
recognize that relief cannot go on forever. Grants-in-aid should give 
way to soft loans and small-scale revolving loan funds should be set up, 
wherever practical, to help people obtain the funds they need to begin
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enterprises that will help them become self-sufficient. Credit has another 
benefit. It reduces the people’s exploitation by money-lenders.
L. DEBT
Unless adequate development assistance is provided, many displaced 
persons will soon become encumbered by debt. This means that the 
people will be easily exploited by the populations among whom they live 
and, if the conflict is resolved, the people will be unable to return to 
their original homes quickly because of the debt incurred.
M. WOMEN’S ISSUES
The majority of displaced adults are women and most of these are 
heads of households. In many emergency programs, especially in 
garrison towns and at the periphery of the conflict zones, women and 
children make up two-thirds to three-quarters of the population, yet most 
relief programs have a distinct male bias. For example, many loan 
programs created to assist the displaced are less effective because women 
are not eligible to apply. Other programs, such as food-for-work, are 
often predicated on males being the primary breadwinners.
Women’s programs tend to be minimal; few go beyond handicraft 
projects or small cottage industries. No program of assistance for 
displaced persons will succeed unless it is designed to involve women in 
decision-making at all levels.
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VII. PROJECT FUNDING
The funding of projects and activities for displaced persons is often 
difficult. National governments usually view assistance programs as 
competing with higher priority development projects. In cases where the 
government is hostile to the displaced, they often fear that assistance will 
encourage people to stay in areas where the government or host 
communities do not want them.
A government’s reluctance to devote development resources to 
displaced persons presents special problems for the international 
humanitarian assistance system. UNDP does not have an emergency 
fund. Its own funds are linked to the Indicative Planning Figure (IPF). 
This means that the government and UNDP must reorient the country 
program and divert funds from development programs (which may be 
focused on the government’s principal supporters). Most governments 
are reluctant to divert these funds and may insist that funding should 
come from other sources. This means that UNDP must help the 
government formulate an appeal for additional funding, a lengthy and 
time consuming process that may leave large numbers of people exposed 
until new money is obtained.
Another source of funding is the Special Program Reserve (SPR). 
UNDP can grant up to $50,000 to a government for an emergency. 
However, this amount is usually too small to have a significant impact. 
There is a provision in the SPR that up to $1,000,000 can be used for 
rehabilitation after a given disaster. In some cases, it has been possible 
to use the SPR to provide long-term assistance for the displaced, but this 
too is usually inadequate.
As the Resident UN Coordinator for Disaster Assistance, the UNDP 
ResRep may formulate appeals on behalf of the government. These 
appeals are made to UN member countries. The donors may respond to 
an appeal by giving money directly to the government, by contracting 
NGOs or other institutions, or by contracting private sector companies 
to carry out a project on behalf of the government. As mentioned, the 
formulation of an appeal and procurement of the necessary funds can be 
a lengthy process. Furthermore, since the appeal is usually projectized 
(divided into a series of projects that can be funded separately), overall 
funding may be piecemeal and leave large gaps in the service coverage. 
It is usually easy to obtain funding for feeding programs, medical
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interventions and other emergency assistance, but obtaining funds for 
long-term community improvements and the development aid needed to 
help the displaced integrate successfully into their temporary communities 
is much more difficult.
Another major problem with the appeal process is that, in order to 
get a government hostile to the displaced to provide assistance, 
compromises must often be made to provide assistance that meets the 
government’s priorities as well as those of the displaced. But UNDP 
cannot guarantee that these compromise projects will be funded. Donors 
will usually respond only to the most urgent needs of the displaced, 
creating resentment with the government that their priorities were not 
addressed.
An example of this occurred in Sudan in 1988. Because of 
disruptions that the conflict had caused to the agricultural cycle in 
northern Bahr-el-Ghazal, famine conditions developed and hundreds of 
thousands of people began to flee north. As the people left the South, 
they came under attack from armed Arab militia in the North. As many 
as 50,000 people may have died in these attacks. The survivors, 
emaciated and starving, reached areas where NGOs could provide 
assistance and sanctuary. Just as the world’s attention began to focus on 
this human rights problem, massive floods struck central Sudan, 
devastating Khartoum and many towns along the Nile. In the 
formulation of an emergency appeal for Sudan, the UN reached a 
compromise with the government: an appeal for reconstruction
assistance for flood affected areas would be included with an appeal for 
emergency aid for the displaced in the South and for the communities to 
which they were fleeing in the North. The donors, however, chose to 
concentrate all their assistance on the South and ignored reconstruction 
needs in Khartoum and the other Nile regions. When it became clear to 
the Sudanese that Khartoum was being ignored, they began putting 
obstacles in the way of agencies providing aid in the South. An already- 
acrimonious relationship between donors and the government grew even 
worse. This also affected the relationship between UNDP and the 
government, which accused the UN of failing to honor its commitments.
Obtaining sufficient funding for projects is always difficult. 
However, there are ways to increase the funding base, especially for 
activities that require local currency. Since UNDP normally only deals 
with foreign currency inputs in the regular program, these alternative 
sources of funds are usually overlooked.
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Other sources of funding for projects to support displaced persons 
are:
A. COUNTERPART FUNDS
Counterpart funds are the proceeds from sales of commodities (and 
sometimes hard currencies) in the general market. The commodity is 
given to the government to sell at auction and the proceeds go into an 
account in the central bank; joint signatures are required to withdraw and 
use the funds, and expenditures must meet certain criteria set by the 
original donor. These criteria usually include emergency or disaster 
purposes. Major holders of counterpart funds usually include the U.S., 
the European Community, European governments, and the World Bank. 
Because joint agreement is needed to commit funds, it may be difficult 
to use counterpart currencies for the displaced.
B. LOCAL CURRENCY ACCOUNTS OF DONORS
Donors often hold large sums of local currency on hand in their own 
accounts as a result of sales of disposable equipment, etc. These funds 
can often be used for emergency operations but the amounts available are 
generally small.
C. BLOCKED CURRENCY
Large corporations doing business in the Third World often have 
difficulty converting local profits to hard currency due to governmental 
currency restrictions. In many cases, these corporations have large local 
currency accounts that they cannot convert to hard currencies. The 
money in these accounts is called "blocked currency", i.e., the 
government has blocked its conversion and export. Since inflation may 
erode the value of the money at an alarming rate, many companies are 
willing to sell the money at a substantial discount, thus at least recouping 
some of the value. It may also be possible to persuade a corporation to 
donate the currency as a charitable contribution; depending on the tax 
laws of the country where the corporation is based, it may be possible 
for them to get a tax credit close to the original hard currency value of 
the account.
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International airlines are good places to look for blocked currencies. 
Many hold large amounts in accounts in countries where they no longer 
operate.
D. DEBT-FOR-EQUITY SWAPS (DEBT SWAPS)
The term "debt-for-equity swap", or "debt swap", refers to a scheme 
where non-performing loans held by private foreign banks are sold at a 
discount to an organization operating in the country that borrowed the 
money. The organization buys the note in hard currency at a discount 
from the creditor, presents the note at a special "window" of the 
country’s central bank, then the country buys back the loan in local 
currency. Often a broker is contracted to work out the details. This is 
formalized in a "treaty" that sets out the rate at which the buy back will 
occur and the amount of local currency that will be paid against the face 
value of the note.
Debt swaps were very popular several years ago but recently 
enthusiasm cooled when it was evident that large corporations were using 
the local currency for their operating expenses and not to support new 
investments in the country. However, most countries have continued to 
encourage debt swaps where they have been assured that the money will 
be used for development or emergency purposes. In 1989, UNICEF was 
able to arrange a debt swap from a consortium of Swiss and Belgian 
banks that was used to finance a major water program in Sudan. In 
many cases, banks can be persuaded to contribute a non- or 
weak-performing loan as a charitable gift and receive a sizeable tax 
write-off (often at, or close to, the original value of the loan).
Debt swaps are a good way to obtain sizeable quantities of local 
currency for longer term activities such as reconstruction and 
development projects.
E. MONETIZATION OF FOOD AID
It may be possible to obtain foreign food aid from a major donor 
(e.g., the U.S., Canada, EEC) and arrange to sell it to local private 
traders. The proceeds for the sales would then be used to finance local 
currency costs of assistance programs.
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VIII. OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES
A. ASSESSMENT
The key to successful intervention in any emergency operation is 
accurate information about the situation and needs. This information is 
gathered through the process of assessment. The term "assessment" 
refers to the process of collecting information to determine the overall 
situation, the needs, the status of the people, the adequacy of the services 
being provided, and the conditions in the settlements where the displaced 
are living. This is a continuing process, for situations change rapidly 
and an assessment only provides a "snapshot" of events at a specific 
point in time.
To gather the information needed for project planning, assessments 
should be thoroughly planned and carried out by competent and 
experienced personnel. Far too often, assessments develop inaccurate 
and highly subjective data. At the same time, it is important to avoid 
collecting too much information; lengthy analyses and the time- 
consuming process of gathering statistics of doubtful value will slow 
response. The objective should be to gather information that points to 
indicators of problems. Assessments should trigger specific actions and 
feed information to relief agencies that will enable them to plan projects.
There are generally five sets of information that an assessment should 
develop:
1. Information about the general situation;
2. Data about the people’s needs;
3. Information about requirements in specific sectors such as food, 
health, nutrition, shelter, etc;
4. Information about the resources available to meet needs; and
5. Epidemiological information about disease or public health 
threats.
Additional information about disaster assessments can found in 
Appendix A.
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B. PREDICTING MIGRATION ROUTES AND PATTERNS
Migration occurs normally in every country and tends to follow set 
patterns. There is an element of rural-to-urban migration even in the 
best of times, and migrants tend to follow defined routes as they leave 
the rural areas and move towards the larger cities. Migration is usually 
in segments with people first moving to medium-sized towns and 
remaining there until the labor market is saturated, then moving on to the 
larger cities and the country’s capital.
In most cases, there are migration "seasons". It is not unusual, for 
example, to see a significant increase in migration at the end of a harvest 
season. Farmers who have had a poor harvest migrate, as well as those 
who have accumulated enough cash to make a longer move.
Nomadic migration routes and patterns are also important to 
consider. In normal times, their migration should be relatively conflict- 
free: they tend to follow established routes and well-defined schedules 
which let them pass through more settled areas without disturbing local 
agriculture or ecology. It is when these migration patterns change that 
conflict arises. For example, in Darfur, in western Sudan, Arab nomads 
leave the northern part of the region and begin to migrate southward in 
November and December. They normally enter areas farmed by the Fur 
tribe after the Fur have harvested their crops and before they begin 
preparations for planting. In recent years, however, drought and 
increasing desertification have forced the nomads to move much earlier, 
bringing their animals into the Fur zones while crops are still standing. 
The nomads’ herds graze and trample the crops leading the Fur to take 
up arms to defend their lands. Thus, during drought and famine conflict 
increases substantially and periodically escalates into widespread conflict 
between the two tribes.
Two factors to analyze to determine if nomadic migration could lead 
to conflict are:
• the routes and how they change during periods of stress; and
• the time, or season, of migration.
1- Normal Migration Routes: Most migration routes can be mapped 
easily. In Sudan, for example, most nomadic routes tend to go 
north-south, because nomads must move southward during dry 
periods to find more abundant pasture and supplies of water.
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Migration to cities also tends to follow established routes. For 
example, people migrating from the north-central part of the South 
tend to follow the railway. Migration from the eastern regions tends 
to follow the main paved highway to Khartoum.
In Sudan, which is currently experiencing civil war and is 
constantly threatened by famine, a number of interesting proposals 
which can serve as examples have been developed to use UNDP 
development resources to support the displaced.
The UNDP Emergency Unit in Khartoum has proposed a broad, 
community-based approach for dealing with the large numbers of 
displaced persons fleeing the conflict in the South. Previously, most 
efforts have been focused on providing food, shelter and water to 
those people living in camps along the primary routes out of the 
conflict zone. In the new approach, UNDP has advocated treating 
the displaced as migrants and focusing development aid on the 
communities where the displaced have congregated. One objective 
of this approach is to increase employment opportunities so that the 
displaced can find work to provide sufficient income to take care of 
their own needs. With an expanded economy, the need for costly 
relief would be reduced and the people would be able to live a more 
normal life until they can return to their homes.
The second objective of this approach is to reduce the likelihood 
that the influx of the displaced would lead to localized conflict. Few 
of the affected communities had sufficient resources to accommodate 
large numbers of migrants. Most towns in the semi-arid areas of the 
Sudan have marginal water supplies, even in the best of times, and 
agriculture is limited due to the lack of irrigation and technical input. 
Thus, the existing population quickly came to resent the influx of 
outsiders, and the potential for conflict and human rights violations 
was high. The UNDP program was designed to pre-empt conflict by 
increasing the resource base. Projects were designed to expand 
water economic opportunities for both the local and incoming 
populations.
In sum, the UNDP simply used crisis-induced migration as an 
indicator of where to target and focus development aid. Relief was 
left to non-governmental organizations while a broader, whole 
community approach was adopted by the UN system.
Another factor of note is that migration routes tend to follow 
grain trading routes.
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2. Changes in the Routes Due to Crisis: When crisis occurs, normal 
migration routes may change. For example, in Sudan migration 
changes significantly from north-south to west-east.
As people leave established migration routes, conflict may begin 
to occur. In most cases, it is possible to anticipate what changes in 
migration are likely. For example, nomads are likely to move 
towards more secure water points. In times of severe food shortage, 
nomads may send members of the family or clan to towns or labor 
poles to find work. (This strategy not only provides income, but 
reduces the number of mouths to be fed with available resources.) 
The shedding of family members occurs when the nomads cross a 
major transit point, such as a road or a railway, where they can get 
transport to a labor pole.
3. Stopping Points: It is important to identify areas where the displaced 
are likely to stop during their migration, either to work to earn more 
money or to try to settle, even if temporarily. As soon as the 
stopping places are identified, it is usually possible to investigate the 
absorptive capacity of the community and to determine whether or 
not the presence of the displaced is likely to create conflict, because 
of racial, cultural or economic factors.
4. Traditional Animosities: A key factor to consider is whether or not 
there are existing animosities between the host population and the 
displaced that might be exacerbated by a sudden influx. Any time 
"outsiders" come into a community, tensions are likely to increase. 
If there is a history of conflict between the two societies, a sudden 
crisis-induced migration is likely to be resented by the host 
community and flash-points for conflict may be generated.
C. SETTING PRIORITIES
Priorities in programs for the displaced change over time. In or near 
conflict zones, the top priority is usually protection. A balanced 
emergency assistance program may also be a top priority in order to 
save lives. Often protection is dependent on assistance since an 
international presence in the area must be established to begin the process 
of reducing human rights abuses.
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1. Initial Response: The primary factors that will cause high death 
rates in an emergency are malnutrition, measles and diarrhea. Each 
is related to the other. A child that is severely malnourished will not 
be able to survive a case of measles. Severe diarrhea can quickly 
dehydrate and kill a malnourished person or someone with measles. 
In order to save lives, these three threats must be addressed. 
Therefore, the cornerstones of an effective emergency response are 
provision of food, immunization, and diarrhea control — which is 
carried out by providing clean water, oral rehydration and sanitation. 
Until these three sets of problems are addressed, it will be difficult 
to prevent increased mortality, especially among women and 
children.
2. Priorities in Settlements: In the period immediately after arriving in 
settlements, special attention should be focused on women and 
children since it has been shown that abnormally high infant 
mortality rates occur during the first six months after the displaced 
arrive at their destinations.
3. Priorities During the Settlement Phase: At this stage, the top priority 
is providing employment opportunities so that families can earn 
enough money to survive until they can return to their homes.
D. STRENGTHENING COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS
As a provider of technical assistance, UNDP plays a key role in 
helping governments to develop the capacity to deal with the problems 
of displacement. In the initial stages of a crisis, few governments are 
adequately prepared to handle the problems of displaced persons. UNDP 
can support governments by providing experts, training and financial 
support.
A great deal of forethought should be given to proposals to create 
institutions or capacities in government to assist the displaced. The type 
of institution created often has implications for the way in which 
assistance will ultimately be provided. For example, if UNDP 
encourages the government to assign responsibility for displaced persons 
to an agency that normally provides assistance to refugees, the displaced 
will likely be treated as a refugee-like problem and more attention will 
be given to relief than to the development needs of the people. If the
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mandate is assigned to regional governments or to a ministry of local 
government, it is likely that the programs will be much broader and 
more developmental in nature.
In some cases, UNDP has encouraged the government to establish a 
separate commission for the displaced to serve as coordinator of 
assistance and protection and to formulate plans which are executed by 
the line ministries. This approach can work well as long as the technical 
assistance given does not encourage the agency to focus more on relief 
than on development assistance.
Local and regional branches of government are often the most 
important entities in providing assistance to the displaced. When 
considering technical assistance and institution building, they should 
receive high priority. The emergency program for displaced persons 
carried out in Sri Lanka, which is considered by many experts to be one 
of the best projects ever designed in this field, was carried out almost 
exclusively by district officials in, and adjacent to, the conflict zone.
In countries that have weak regional and local governments, there is 
a tendency to centralize authority and decision-making in the capital. 
UNDP must devise strategies for moving decision-making into the theater 
of operations so that "hands on" management can take place.
In large countries where the displaced are located in remote areas, 
centralized government decision-making can delay operations and affect 
the quality of decisions. In these cases, it is important to devise 
strategies that will force the government to send senior officials with the 
authority to make on-site decisions to the field. One way to do this is to 
build a large operations base in a central location and endow it with 
resources. Governments are unlikely to trust such an operation to a 
junior official and will send a person with sufficient authority so key 
assistance issues can probably be resolved locally.
E. TASKFORCES
The needs of the displaced are often far too great for any one agency 
to provide adequate assistance. Furthermore, needs may change 
dramatically from one location to another. In order to develop the best 
mix of programs and to ensure the widest possible range of services, it 
may be possible to create inter-agency task forces in each area. NGOs 
often form consortia to combine their talents and resources. UNDP 
coordinators should encourage this, wherever possible, and provide
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technical assistance in support of inter-agency efforts. Task forces made 
up of UN and NGO teams are one of the most cost-effective ways of 
providing assistance and ensuring that adequate resources are provided 
in each key sector.
F. SAFETY OF RELIEF TEAMS IN CONFLICT ZONES
As the UN coordinator of assistance for the displaced, resident 
coordinators bear a special responsibility for ensuring that all personnel 
operating in or adjacent to conflict zones work in conditions of minimum 
risk and maximum security. Guidelines and procedures for personnel 
should be established in conjunction with the host government and, 
where possible, insurgent groups. UNDP is often charged with the 
responsibility of notifying relief workers and other organizations about 
the risks they may face from military operations in or near their relief 
activities. In this regard, UNDP is often able to obtain clearances for 
special flights into contested areas on airplanes bearing United Nations 
markings, to arrange for safe transport through the front lines in 
specially-marked UN vehicles, and to establish special relief corridors 
whereby food and relief supplies can be delivered under flags of truce or 
through designated corridors without undue restraint. It is important, 
however, that the UN carefully assess the risks before encouraging relief 
organizations to commit personnel and resources to an operation in a 
non-secure area. A UN assurance that an area or means of transport is 
safe carries a lot of weight — and responsibility.
Two of the most important aspects of working in remote and insecure 
areas are communications and stand-by evacuation support. To the 
greatest extent possible, UN coordinators should ensure that relief 
personnel have immediate and 24-hour access to telecommunications 
facilities and that suitable means are immediately available to evacuate 
personnel in case of an emergency. This may entail the assignment of 
light aircraft to be available on short notice to evacuate staff.
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G. RELIEF VS. DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES
It is important to recognize that UNDP’s strengths lie in 
development, not relief. This is not an obstacle; rather, it is an 
advantage for assisting the displaced since most of their needs are long­
term.
H. REPATRIATION DURING CONFLICT
It is not unusual for large numbers of people to voluntarily return to 
their homes amidst a conflict. It has been shown that the displaced 
usually maintain fairly good communications with those left behind and, 
when conditions are appropriate, people may choose to return if they feel 
that it is relatively safe or that the conditions that forced them to leave 
have been altered.
The return of large numbers of people can provide many clues to a 
changing situation. Program staff should monitor the returns and try to 
determine where people are going and what factors motivated their 
return. Large-scale spontaneous returns often imply that a major change 
has taken place in the political situation and that "space" has been created 
whereby many others could go back without undue risks.
UNDP staff should be alert for signs of repatriation since they may 
afford an opportunity to stabilize areas, reduce conflict and initiate 
localized reconstruction.
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IX. ISSUES IN DEALING WITH THE HOST COUNTRY
A. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
One of the most difficult things for UNDP staff to deal with is 
human rights violations perpetrated by the national government. 
Unfortunately, displaced persons are often the victims. Staff should be 
alert for evidence that human rights abuses are occurring and promptly 
report any suspected abuses to the Resident Coordinator.
Human rights abuses may be classified as both overt and passive. 
Overt abuses are acute, violent actions designed to kill, maim or 
intimidate the displaced. Passive abuses are usually less dramatic, but 
can lead to very high death rates, especially among women and children. 
Actions such as denying people food or water, forced relocation into 
conflict zones, forcible removal of people from urban areas to regions 
where resources or food and shelter are not available, all constitute 
examples of passive human rights abuses.
A major problem in dealing with governments is control over 
paramilitary organizations and unregulated militia. Governments often 
arm civilian populations to "protect" themselves in, or adjacent to, 
conflict zones. Often these militia use their new-found arms to settle old 
scores and to organize raids against their neighbors. UNDP staff should 
be especially alert for signs that human rights abuses are being carried 
out by these groups.
B. THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS
If most of the displaced people are from an ethnic or cultural group 
different from that of the population majority, the role of a government 
in providing relief and assistance becomes a delicate issue. No matter 
who the displaced are, ultimate responsibility for their welfare and 
maintenance falls squarely on the shoulders of the government. This 
does not mean that governments can, or should, be involved directly in 
all cases of assistance. For example, in a civil war, the government is 
one party of the conflict, and any assistance to the displaced will be 
viewed within the political context. How and where, then, does a 
government determine its assistance role?
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Several principles should be observed. First, the government must 
be made to understand clearly that the welfare of the displaced will be 
a key to any peaceful resolution of the conflict. If the displaced are 
abused, not properly cared for, starved or permitted to languish without 
adequate supplies, government opposition will be fueled. One only has 
to look at parallel experience in refugee assistance. 
Spontaneously-settled refugees who are working contribute proportionally 
less money and manpower to insurgent movements than refugees in 
camps. Therefore, the displaced must be taken out of the conflict 
equation by ensuring the highest level of services and job opportunities 
possible.
Second, where the majority of displaced are from cultural or ethnic 
minorities, a government should provide the overall framework for 
assistance but remain only indirectly involved in actual assistance to the 
displaced communities. Since a government cannot be neutral in a 
conflict, it must often remove itself from the provision of assistance and 
allow international or other neutral organizations to give direct aid. The 
Secretary of the Ministry of Rehabilitation in Sri Lanka once remarked 
that the greatest contribution the government made to assisting the 
displaced during their civil war was to stand aside and allow NGOs to 
work.
This principle, however, is somewhat limited since, in reality, few 
NGOs have the capability to sustain major relief operations over wide 
areas for long periods of time. In other words, some degree of 
government involvement will always be necessary. Where then, should 
a government allocate its resources and where should it rely primarily on 
NGOs?
The answer is usually found in the geography of the situation. The 
closer the camps or settlements are to the zone of conflict, the more 
neutral NGOs should be involved; the greater the distance from the zone 
of conflict, and in spontaneous settlements in urban areas, the greater the 
involvement of the government can be.
This principle is also compatible with government and NGO 
capabilities. Generally, governments are poorly-suited to operate in 
camps while NGOs often specialize in these types of services. On the 
other hand, government is always structured to provide municipal 
services. Extension of water, sanitation, etc., is not only easy, it is also 
more cost-effective since new mechanisms, structures, ministries, etc., 
do not have to be formed. Thus, governments should plan to build on
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the inherent strengths of their own mechanisms and those of the NGOs, 
and avoid creating new institutions.
C. RELOCATION OF THE DISPLACED
Sooner or later, every government proposes some sort of relocation 
program despite overwhelming evidence that such programs are rarely 
successful and require a major commitment of funding. If a government 
decides to go ahead with relocation, it is important that criteria be set to 
ensure that all moves are entirely voluntary. If a government is to avoid 
controversy, the following policies should be established and observed:
1. All relocations must be voluntary.
2. An internationally-recognized NGO should verify that each move 
is voluntary.
3. No government-sanctioned relocation should be undertaken if the 
proposed site is in a zone of conflict.
4. If an individual chooses to relocate on his own to a site that is in 
or near a conflict zone, financial support for the move should be 
provided by a non-governmental or international agency rather 
than by the government.
5. No relocation activities should take place until adequate food, 
water and public health services are ready on site to service the 
resettled families.
6. Once relocated, a framework for assistance should be 
immediately available to help people make the transition to their 
new life.
A special office should be set up to coordinate any type of relocation 
or resettlement activity. A typical system should be structured to work 
more or less as follows:
1. The relocation office should inventory job possibilities in 
different locations.
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2. Relocation caseworkers should then establish office hours at a 
location in or near DP settlements. Notices regarding relocation 
opportunities and assistance should be posted or announced in 
camps or in areas with high concentrations of displaced persons.
3. Volunteers responding to the notices should be assigned to a case 
worker.
4. The case worker should provide counselling to determine where 
the family wants to go and what assistance would be required.
5. A specific job should be identified for the head of the family and 
guaranteed before the registration process continues.
6. Once the source of employment is guaranteed, relocation 
arrangements can be finalized. A NGO should meet with the 
family, review the arrangements, and certify that the relocation 
is voluntary.
7. The move commences upon completion of this verification.
The Limits to Relocation Incentives
Governments often try to force people to relocate by exerting various 
types of pressure — some subtle, others overt. Widespread debate is 
currently surfacing about how far governments can go in trying to force 
compliance with their resettlement objectives. In the worst-case 
scenario, government troops cordon off a section of a community, round 
up the people, and physically convey them to the relocation site (often 
bulldozing or burning their houses to discourage them from returning).
In a less traumatic but still harsh and unacceptable approach, 
governments have cut off water or food supplies to relief-dependent 
communities in the hope of forcing the people to move out. Such a 
move is usually accompanied by an announcement that subsidized food 
and other relief services will be available at the new site.
In urban areas, governments may take a more subtle approach. As 
a spontaneous community begins to form, the government simply ignores 
its existence and neglects to extend municipal services such as water, 
sanitation and electricity to the new settlement.
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That a government has the right to decide on its urban development 
policies is indisputable. Furthermore, there are often very legitimate 
reasons for not wanting a community to be established or to grow in a 
certain area. All governments have the right of eminent domain and the 
right to use legal methods to plan and guide urban growth. Despite this, 
the overwhelming evidence shows that virtually all moves to resettle 
people involuntarily fail. In forced resettlement, the government only 
alienates the affected population and increases their determination to 
return to the place from which they were evicted. When families do 
return, they may take greater precautions to integrate into the host 
community and find other, more secure sites to settle, making it even 
more difficult for the government to find them and send them back to the 
relocation site.
"Carrot and stick" approaches may meet with some success but, 
ultimately, success will be more dependent on income and employment 
opportunities than on provision of relief supplies. Few governments are 
adequately prepared, especially financially, to support displaced persons 
between the time of the move and the time that they are fully established 
in new settlements. As soon as the level of service falls, people will 
begin to abandon the settlement and return to the community from which 
they were relocated.
Economically, agencies should be cautious with regard to "carrot and 
stick" approaches. It is expensive enough to supply relief services to 
DPs in spontaneous settlements; moving DPs to a relocation center 
escalates the level of support required and, thus, the costs. Governments 
that try this approach soon realize that its limits are more financial than 
logistical. Supporting people with any degree of self-help is much better 
than creating an artificial relief situation that must be maintained for any 
length of time.
The least successful approach is that of creating disincentives to 
spontaneous settlements by neglecting to provide urban services. There 
will always be entrepreneurs who will find ways of supplying needed 
services (e.g., donkey cart water tankers). In the end, the cost to the 
government will be higher if services are not provided in a logical and 
planned manner as the communities evolve. It is always more costly to 
go back and install utilities in dense, unplanned settlements than to lay 
out a community in a logical manner and encourage growth along 
rational lines.
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The disease factor should also be considered. By refusing to extend 
water, sanitation and health services into spontaneous settlements, a 
government increases the likelihood of communicable disease outbreaks. 
No government can afford to ignore the adage that "disease knows no 
boundaries". Conditions of overcrowding, poor sanitation and unclean 
water are the breeding ground of epidemics that may spread to planned 
areas.
D. REPATRIATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS
Periodically, large numbers of displaced persons may suddenly return 
to their original areas. Sometimes this is voluntary, at others it may be 
due to encouragement of the government. In the worst case, it is a result 
of government pressures or force. In order to develop responses, it is 
important to understand the various scenarios under which returns take 
place. They include:
• Spontaneous return;
• Aided voluntary return;
• Passive actions on the part of the government to prevent people 
from obtaining basic services or economic opportunities;
• Coercion (direct action by government or political forces to 
threaten and harass people into leaving); and
• Forced removal.
1 • Spontaneous Return: The process of spontaneous return is probably 
the least understood of all migration movements. Even at the height 
of intensive conflict, significant numbers of people often return. 
Most go back for non-conflict-related reasons. These may include 
fears that they will lose their land, concerns about raising children 
in an alien environment, lack of job opportunities in the areas where 
they have resettled, both overt and passive discrimination, and 
dissatisfaction with the circumstances under which they live as 
displaced persons. In some cases, there is also a positive side.
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People are often able to accumulate enough capital to enable them to 
return and replace lost resources.
Spontaneous returns often encourage or stimulate other types of 
returns. A small trickle of people returning from San Salvador to 
the Marzon and Chalatenango provinces of El Salvador quickly 
triggered massive returns of displaced persons and led to large-scale 
repatriations of people from Honduras six months later.
Spontaneous returns tend to be self-regulating: people most
likely to be successful at reintegrating and finding sustained 
employment are the most likely to return on their own.
2. Aided Voluntary Return: When assistance is provided to returnees 
by government or international agencies, the process can be 
classified as "aided voluntary return". Assistance may include a full 
range of services, from providing transport and sustenance en route 
to providing protection and rehabilitation assistance. Assisting 
voluntary returns under international supervision is the best way to 
encourage repatriation. However, assistance can also slow return. 
People may be afraid of registering for assistance; or returnees may 
try to manipulate the system for greater gain or force donors to 
increase benefits.
Aided repatriations have also drawn fire from human rights 
activists. They point out that the UN, ICRC and other international 
agencies are often the last to know if areas are secure, and that by 
working with returnees, they often inadvertently send signals that an 
area is safe when it is not.
3. Passive Coercion: Actions by governments to encourage the
displaced to repatriate usually are unsuccessful. If people are not 
ready to go, turning off their water may increase their hardships and 
even force them to relocate somewhere else, but will only rarely lead 
to large-scale return. However, the cumulative effects of passive 
government actions may lead some families to explore the possibility 
of returning and, if they become aware of ongoing spontaneous or 
aided voluntary returns, the families may choose to return.
4. Coercion: Active measures to threaten or harass people into leaving 
are usually counterproductive and almost always lead to violence and
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repression. If unchecked, this can lead to incidents resulting in 
hundreds of deaths.
Patterns of harassment to be alert for include:
• arrest and detainment of community leaders;
• disappearances of community leaders;
• aggressive acts against women;
• acts of thuggery against people in settlements; and
• threats and warnings to people to leave.
Coercion usually results in solidifying people’s resistance, not in 
widespread return. If, however, there is substantial spontaneous 
repatriation already occurring, people may choose to leave.
5. Forced Returns: Forced relocation is usually carried out by military 
or paramilitary forces. The usual pattern is for the military to arrive 
at a settlement in predawn darkness, cordon off the area, arouse the 
community, give them a few minutes to collect their belongings and 
then put them on trucks to be carried out of the area. If the people 
resist, the army may resort to destroying the people’s shelters to 
force them to move. This may lead to violence resulting in a large 
number of civilian casualties.
Forced relocations require a lot of logistics planning and, more 
importantly, a lot of resources. For this reason, the authorities 
usually target small, isolated settlements that can be surrounded and 
moved quickly.
Roles for the United Nations
Only by understanding the reasons why people are going back, the 
process of return, and the political, economic and military environment, 
can accurate decisions be made about possible intervention strategies. 
Once these parameters are understood, it should be possible to identify 
strategies of assistance which can help returnees. If the people appeal 
for assistance once they are home, the UN may consider a range of relief 
and rehabilitation in the belief that assistance will alter the political 
situation, and more returns will be possible. This is rarely the case.
If returnees appeal for help, the UN may engage in a wide range of 
activities to assist. These could include:
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• organizing orderly departures and safe transport;
• negotiating safe transit through troubled areas; and
• providing rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance to 
returnees.
Repatriation should be closely monitored to determine those areas 
that are relatively safe. Experience has shown that there are many areas 
where development projects are possible and reconstruction can take 
place.
A note of caution: If the United Nations, ICRC or other
international agency becomes involved in negotiations for safe corridors 
or in any way attempts to direct the stream of people, there is a 
possibility that the risks for returnees could be increased. Negotiators 
must take caution to ensure that the areas of return do not become points 
for negotiation. Any specification of areas is likely to draw the attention 
of opposing forces who may not want repatriation to those zones.
If coercion and force are used, the United Nations must act to stop 
it immediately. Strong protests should be delivered and a coordinated 
effort among the donors must be mobilized. It is also important to 
engage the press since news of these events can embarrass the 
government and often force it to stop.
One of the questions likely to be raised is what conditions the United 
Nations should place on the government in return for becoming involved 
in repatriation. The principal condition is that all returns be strictly 
voluntary. Second, and of equal importance, is that the government set 
no limits regarding areas to which people can return.
The biggest obstacle to assisting returnees is likely to be human 
rights violations. The UN should promote disengagement of forces in 
areas likely to receive large numbers of returnees and, where possible, 
to discourage actions by militia and irregular forces.
At the present time, the international community is severely 
constrained and is not in a good position to provide human rights 
monitoring. Nonetheless, it is important to establish "witness to 
violence" activities and encourage NGO and ICRC presence in the areas 
of return.
Safe Corridors for Repatriation
A common proposal is for the United Nations to establish safe 
corridors through which the returnees can pass. The record is marginal.
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Corridors result in compressing large numbers of people into small, 
defined areas, making returnees easy prey for bandits and irregular 
forces. It also gives the government an opportunity to regulate the flow 
of people and screen them. Human rights violations usually increase 
when corridors are established. Air transport is less problematic, though 
much more expensive, and the government can still screen and regulate 
passage without difficulty.
Often governments will encourage people to return to areas without 
ascertaining whether or not it is really feasible. If the first returnees find 
difficulty in getting back or reintegrating, others in the pipeline may be 
stranded en route. In the worst case, people could end up in temporary 
camps waiting for a resolution to their situation, and relief agencies 
would be required to initiate programs to sustain them. For this reason, 
any aided repatriation must be carefully monitored to ensure that people 
are reaching their destination before the next group is transported.
A summary of information needed to make repatriation decisions is 
attached as Appendix B.
E. REGISTRATION
At some point in every assistance program, the question of whether 
to register displaced persons (and how to carry it out) will arise. 
Registration is a legitimate concern, not only of the government but also 
of other humanitarian agencies. Overall population statistics are one 
important by-product of registration, and protection and tracing are good 
reasons for some form to be adopted. However, it is important that the 
registration system be secure and that it be designed in such a way that 
it cannot be used to provide any party with information that might be 
detrimental to the DPs.
Several options exist for registering displaced persons:
1. Assigning registration to a neutral international organization such as 
a UN agency or the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). The primary advantage to this approach is that the neutral 
body is the only one maintaining lists, and central control can be 
maintained to discourage misuse of registration cards. Statistics may 
be provided to the government or other entities as necessary for 
planning purposes.
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2. Designating a lead agency in each community as the registrar for the 
settlement. Each agency carries out registration using a standard 
format developed by all the participating agencies and produces 
over-all information for statistical and planning use. Each 
organization is responsible for ensuring that errors or duplication are 
minimized for the communities they serve.
3. Using a multi-organization registration system. A system utilizing 
the services of a number of assisting organizations can be developed 
and made secure through random numbering. To do this, a standard 
registration card is issued to each family bearing the logos of the 
participating relief agencies. Upon receiving a card, the head of the 
family goes to the registering agency and is issued a number which 
is recorded for verification purposes only. The card can be 
presented at any time to any one of the participating agencies to 
obtain relief supplies or services. The recording organization is 
responsible for making periodic inspections of different distribution 
programs to ensure that duplication is minimized.
It should be remembered that DPs will actively seek to avoid any type 
of registration, including surveys to enumerate the population and other 
information-gathering activities. They recognize that they are in a 
precarious legal position and, in short, do not want to be on anyone’s 
list.
F. HOSTILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO INTERNATIONAL 
AGENCIES
Governments committing human rights abuses or denying the 
displaced their full rights as citizens will soon be in an adversarial 
relationship with donors. Eventually, the government is likely to become 
hostile to the presence of international agencies and accuse them of 
interfering with the national sovereignty of the country. Non­
governmental organizations are likely to bear the brunt of the 
government’s displeasure. In this situation the UN should formulate a 
comprehensive program framework under which the NGOs can operate 
and thereby provide some degree of protection for their work. At the 
same time, the UN should be careful not to encourage the NGOs to 
undertake activities on behalf of the international community that will
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lead to a further eroding of their relationship with the host government. 
The UN has often been accused of using the NGOs as a "lightening rod" 
to determine the political limits of a particular program. When the NGO 
gets in trouble, the UN has not been able to provide adequate help.
G. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS
When governments are carrying out human rights abuses, it is often 
difficult for United Nations personnel to obtain travel and work permits 
where the displaced have sought refuge. Restrictions on travel and 
access to the displaced must be vigorously protested and a blanket 
permission to travel to these areas should be sought. The United Nations 
should establish its right to visit the displaced wherever they are as a 
prerequisite for assisting the government.
X. FOOD AID
A. FOOD SECURITY
No discussion of assistance to displaced persons would be complete 
without examining the need to establish food security and programs to 
manage imported food aid. Food security is intricately linked to the 
problems of displacement: it is usually one of the major reasons why 
people flee unstable areas.
To ensure food security for the displaced, the following are needed:
1. Buffer Stocks: Food reserves should be developed in the
communities where the displaced are residing if they are in remote 
or rural areas.
2. Increased Economic Security: It is important that the displaced be 
assisted by giving them the opportunity to earn income and 
participate in the economies to which they have migrated.
Food security requires officials to focus on creative uses of food aid. 
UNDP project officers can assist their government counterparts in 
reviewing various strategies. This is especially important when the 
emergency is over, for continued food relief beyond the emergency can 
create dependencies and have many negative effects on local markets.
B. ALTERNATIVES TO DIRECT DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD
There are many alternatives to direct distribution of food. They 
include:
• Food-for-work programs (FFW);
• Food stamp or food coupon programs;
• Payment in Kind (PiK) programs; and
• Cash-for-work.
The value of these programs is that, if properly planned, they are 
less stressful to individual families than receiving handouts. Much of the
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food provided in food-for-work or food coupon programs will eventually 
be bartered and find its way into the marketplace, thereby increasing the 
overall availability of food in the community. If proper allowances are 
made and if the beneficiaries are targeted properly, alternative 
distribution programs can often serve to help stabilize food prices.
1. Food-for-Work: Typically, FFW projects pay people with food for 
working on public works or community development projects. 
Ideally, food-for-work projects are used as a means of improving the 
land or making improvements that will aid agriculture, such as 
terracing, building water catchments, erosion control measures, and 
irrigation. On a larger basis, FFW may be used for community 
improvements such as building or upgrading farm-to-market roads.
Food-for-work proponents claim that food-for-work is less likely 
to create dependencies than direct food aid and is more 
developmental than direct handouts.
Food-for-work accomplishes multiple objectives: getting food 
into the hands of those most in need, and carrying out projects and 
improvements that serve everyone. Thus, both individuals and 
communities are served.
Projects are not difficult to organize, though paying in food 
means that a food logistics system must be set up to transport and 
store the food prior to distribution. The only difference logistically 
between FFW and direct distribution programs is that final 
distribution is easier and does not require the same degree of 
monitoring.
However, food-for-work has critics. They point out that, unless 
properly planned, FFW often takes on a life of its own. As more 
food enters the community, some will inevitably be sold on the local 
market to buy things that people need other than food. The food is 
normally sold below the market price, which depresses the prices the 
farmers can get for the food they have been able to produce — thus, 
they begin to resent the presence of the displaced.
The objective of any feeding program is to feed those most at 
risk and, in famines, those most at risk are children. Critics of FFW 
point out that it is difficult to establish a correlation between food- 
for-work programs and nutritional improvement. Usually able- 
bodied men participate in the food-for-work programs and, because 
they are undertaking strenuous work, they take a larger portion of
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the food. To compensate, more food may have to be given out. 
This in turn means that more food will be necessary. In a situation 
where food resources are scarce, it may be more expeditious to 
continue dry ration distribution than to phase into a more resource­
consuming program.
Criteria for Planning a Food-for-Work Program:
Food-for-work programs should be designed to provide short-term 
work only. To ensure that this happens, projects should be small-scale 
activities that can be completed in a short period of time. Projects such 
as road construction that take many months or even years to complete, 
or that could be intentionally prolonged by workers or program 
administrators, should be avoided.
In order to ensure that the vulnerable groups receive food, food-for- 
work projects should be developed for women.
Effective screening procedures should be established to ensure that 
the men working in food-for-work programs represent the neediest 
households and those with a high percentage of vulnerable individuals.
2. Food Store and Coupon Approach: A variation on food-for-work is 
the "food store and coupon" program. This program has been used 
with variations in several countries with quite a degree of success. 
A number of experts have suggested that this approach can help to 
remove many of the negative aspects of both food-for-work and cash- 
for-work programs.
Under the program, income-generating projects, similar to those 
established for food-for-work programs, are identified and organized. 
However, the workers are paid in coupons which can be redeemed 
only at a special relief store set up in each community. These stores 
stock food, but also carry other supplies such as health care items, 
charcoal, household utensils, and personal articles that can contribute 
to health and hygiene (soap, toothpaste, etc.). In addition, a limited 
number of personal luxury items may also be sold at the store, for 
which cash or a combination of cash and coupons can be used.
The rationale for this approach is that people will buy only what 
they need. This serves as a natural "regulator" of the amount of 
food coming into the community. Also, people will have the ability 
to buy those things which they would otherwise obtain by selling 
food. Therefore, food provided by the relief program will not be as
■
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likely to end up in the local market competing with food produced 
by local farmers.
If the luxury items are procured from the local market by the 
participating agencies, local shopkeepers will also benefit. The 
amount of input from the agencies should be minimal and, by having 
a greater range of items available at the food store, the program 
should be popular and a greater incentive to work should be 
promoted. Finally, the range of foods provided at the coupon store 
can include those that are specially targeted for vulnerable groups, 
theoretically ensuring that a greater number of those most in need of 
calorie and nutritional inputs will receive them. With items in the 
store being controlled by the relief agencies, it will be possible to 
ensure that the workers principally take home food.
Proponents of the coupon store programs also point out that it is 
easy to establish nutrition monitoring activities in conjunction with, 
and physically adjacent to, the relief store. Open hours can be 
established and redemption days can be printed on the coupons.
3. Cash-for-Work: Cash-for-work, when properly organized, is the
easiest means of providing people with food on a widespread basis. 
Programs are relatively easy to plan and execute, and monitoring is 
simple. The only major concern is the type of project selected: they 
must not take people away from normal agricultural activities and 
should be designed to improve both near- and long-term agricultural 
prospects.
In comparison to food-for-work programs which are generally 
more popular with relief agencies, cash-for-work is less disruptive to 
the local economy. The program is easier to administer — there are 
no commodity logistics to manage — and the projects are easier to 
terminate and to move from one area to another as needs dictate.
Cash-for-work also can infuse much-needed cash into economies 
that have been affected by an influx of displaced persons. In some 
cases, this can stimulate local economic expansion.
Culturally, cash-for-work is not an alien concept, people 
normally work for wages. Therefore, the program is the best way 
to help maintain people’s dignity for it removes the stigma of 
working on a relief program and gives people a choice about how 
they use the money. Since it is known that some of the food in 
food-for-work and other food distribution programs is sold in order
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to buy household commodities such as soap, cooking fuel, etc., cash- 
for-work does away with the restrictions imposed by other programs.
Critics of cash-for-work claim that the people do not spend all 
the money on food, that the purpose of the program is basically to 
fight hunger, and food is what is needed. However, studies of cash- 
for-work programs show that most money is spent for food; claims 
that people spend all their money on alcohol, tobacco and other 
nonessentials are exaggerated.
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XI. WAR’S END
A. IMMEDIATE NEEDS
The conclusion of a war quickly brings many new responsibilities to 
the UN. A distinct set of short-term assistance programs must be 
established to help the people return to their homes and complete the 
process of settling in before reconstruction of the war-torn areas and 
revitalization of the economy can begin. Examples of some of the 
immediate needs are:
1. Family reunification
2. Repatriation assistance
3. Restoration of basic services, especially water and sanitation, 
temporary income support and sometimes, food aid.
B. DEALING WITH THE WAR’S AFTER-EFFECTS
Demobilization of forces presents a number of problems for people 
in the conflict zone. One of the first is land mines. Land mines are one 
of the most lethal and senseless weapons of modern warfare. An 
abundant supply of mines on the international market has made it easy 
for even the poorest guerrilla force to obtain large quantities and sow 
them over vast areas. In the demobilization of forces, the people who 
planted the mines and maintained records on their locations often leave 
the areas before the mines are cleared. Thus, for many months and even 
years after the conflict, people, animals and vehicles stumble over the 
mines and are killed, injured or, in the case of vehicles, damaged or 
destroyed. Therefore, it is important that UNDP immediately organize 
a mine-sweeping organization and meet with the leaders of both forces 
to try to keep the mine-layers in areas where they have sown mines to 
guide mine-sweepers in their removal.
The second lingering after-effect of conflict is the impact that it has 
had on youth. Often, entire generations of young people have been 
denied access to proper schooling and a normal, healthy and supportive 
environment. The failure of governments and the international 
community to get these youths mentally demobilized has been cited as 
one of the major causes of not only high crime rates but also continuing
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political instability in the former conflict zones. Special programs must 
be instigated to help get young people back into productive enterprises 
as soon as possible.
Another major issue is disarming former irregular forces (both rebels 
and paramilitary militia). In civil conflicts, small arms proliferate at an 
alarming rate. Often, virtually everyone in the conflict has access to 
light, but highly lethal, weapons. Assault rifles, pistols and rocket- 
propelled grenades are among the types of weapons that individuals can 
easily hide and that many people will attempt to retain. Innovative ways 
must be found to disarm the population as a means of bringing stability 
back into the area. In some cases, such as Namibia, Mozambique and 
Nicaragua, the UN has offered both cash and commodities to families 
turning in their weapons. In cases where records have been maintained 
indicating which individuals have received them, the surrender of 
weapons may be a desirable prerequisite to obtaining UN assistance.
C. PREPARING FOR RECONSTRUCTION
Reconstruction activities are normally funded by the major donors in 
the international financial institutions such as the World Bank. UNDP 
can play two important roles. First, in the provision of emergency 
rehabilitation assistance, the UN coordinator can develop programs that 
provide aid in such a way that it will support and lay the foundation for 
reconstruction activities. For example, in the provision of emergency 
shelter to help returning refugees and displaced persons, programs can 
be devised to provide building materials such as corrugated iron roofing 
sheets, timbers and wood panelling which can be used for emergency 
shelter and then be reincorporated into a permanent house. Usually, 
such approaches are cheaper than providing tents or other forms of 
emergency shelter that will only be used a short period of time and will 
cost many hundreds of dollars each to procure and deliver to the affected 
areas. By providing tools and materials in the rehabilitation phase, a 
contribution is also being made to reconstruction.
A second way the UN participates in reconstruction is by providing 
technical assistance to government agencies, especially those in the 
affected areas to help rebuild their capabilities and expand their expertise 
in sectors that will require priority attention during the reconstruction 
period.
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Once reconstruction commences, it is not unusual for UNDP to 
provide support and technical assistance to the government to help it 
execute the reconstruction program. This is a vital role, for often new 
institutions will need to be created to plan and coordinate the 
reconstruction program.
Thus, it can be seen that UNDP plays a vital role in preparing a 
country to return to peace.
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ELEMENTS OF ASSESSMENT
1 • Preparedness Planning: An accurate assessment depends on thorough 
planning and preparation. Information needs can be identified well 
in advance; the means of collecting the necessary data and selection 
of formats for collection and presentation of the information should 
be established as part of an organization’s general emergency 
preparedness activities. By preparing to undertake assessments well 
in advance of an emergency, all potential information needs can be 
identified and adequate procedures and methodologies can be 
developed. Standard survey techniques, questionnaires, checklists 
and procedures should be prepared to ensure that all areas are 
examined and the information is reported using standard terminology 
and classification.
2- Survey and Data Collection: The gathering of the information must 
proceed rapidly and thoroughly. In an initial reconnaissance, 
surveyors should look for patterns and indicators of potential 
problems. Using the procedures developed earlier, key problem 
areas are thoroughly checked.
3. Interpretation: Thorough analysis of the information gathered is 
critical. Those doing the analysis must be trained to detect and 
recognize the indicators of problems, to interpret the information, 
and to link the information to action programs.
4. Forecasting: Using the data that has been collected, the assessment 
team must develop estimates about how the situation might develop 
in the future so that contingency plans can be developed. 
Forecasting requires inputs from many specialists, especially persons 
who have had extensive experience in previous emergencies and who 
might be able to detect trends and provide insights as to what course 
an emergency might follow.
5. Reporting: When data analysis and forecasting are complete, it is 
necessary to report and disseminate the results. Reports should be 
prepared in a format that enables managers to formulate plans and
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projects. Essential information should be presented and structured 
so that the main patterns and trends are clear.
6. Monitoring: An assessment should not be seen as an end result, 
rather as one part of a continuing process. The initial assessment 
should provide baseline data and a basis for further monitoring. 
Data systems must be set up so that relief officials can determine 
whether a situation is improving or deteriorating. The systems must 
also provide a means of measuring the effectiveness of relief 
activities. Each assessment or survey should be designed so that it 
builds upon previous surveys and expands the data base.
ASSESSMENT METHODS
Several methods can be used for carrying out assessments. The two 
most common are:
On-Site Visual Inspections bv Trained Observers- Qualified, 
experienced observers can often interview key personnel on site, 
visually review the people, their condition, and the sites where they 
are situated and from these observations prepare estimates about the 
scope and magnitude of the situation.
The problem with visual inspections is that some major problems 
cannot be detected by simple observation. Often, what one can’t see 
is more important than what is visible. For example, death rates, 
which are the most important indicator of stress in a population, 
cannot be determined from observation. In many societies, 
childhood diseases and malnutrition cannot be detected without 
detailed surveys since families routinely keep those children out of 
sight of strangers. In one classic case in East Africa, a survey team 
reported that all was fine in a settlement because they saw no 
malnourished children. A simple survey would have shown that the 
reason was that all the children had already died!
2. Surveys: Simple surveys based on interviews of villagers in the 
affected areas and statistical information collected from registration 
forms of health and feeding centers can provide invaluable data about 
the situation and provide information needed for planning projects.
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Generally, sample surveys are used to determine people’s immediate 
needs and health and nutritional status.
A key assessment activity that must initially be carried out by 
survey is the first health and nutritional assessment. This survey will 
provide the baseline data that will be used to establish the baseline 
data for disease surveillance and for evaluation of nutritional 
progress.
THE KEYS TO SUCCESSFUL ASSESSMENT
Several factors will contribute to the design of a successful and
accurate assessment:
1. Identify the Users. Every element of an assessment should be 
designed to collect information for a specific user. The potential 
users should specify their data needs during the design phase. For 
example, health workers need certain types of information that will 
only be useful in certain formats, usually tables, while a procurement 
officer will need quantitative or statistical data.
2. Identify the Information that is Needed to Plan Specific Programs. 
Too often, assessments collect information that is incomplete or of 
little value for planning relief programs or specific interventions. In 
many cases, information is anecdotal rather than substantive. In 
others, valuable time is wasted collecting detailed information when 
representative data would be just as useful. Determine what 
information is key, the method that must be used to develop the data, 
and how much and how detailed the information needs to be to be 
useful. The type of assistance an agency usually provides should be 
considered when listing the data to be collected. For example, an 
agency that provides food will need to know about availability of 
transport and fuel, road conditions, etc.
3. Consider the Format. It is important to collect, organize and present 
the data in a form useful for analysts and program planners. The 
results must be presented in a form that makes the implications very 
clear so that priorities can be set quickly. With the advent of lap top 
microcomputers with integrated spreadsheets and graphics, it is 
possible to present much of the data in graphic form. By applying
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baselines and standards to the presentation, key relationships can be 
quickly noted. For example, daily death rates should be calculated 
and compared to the international standard of 1.0 deaths per 10,000 
per day.
4. Consider the Timing of the Assessment. Timing can affect the 
accuracy of the assessment since situations and needs can change 
dramatically day to day. Various types of assessments need to be 
timed to collect the necessary information when it is available and 
most useful. Relief needs are always relative; but as a general rule, 
initial surveys should be broad in scope and should determine overall 
patterns and trends. More detailed information can wait until 
emergency operations are well established.
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APPENDIX B
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR REPATRIATION 
DECISION-MAKING
The following is a summary of the information needed to determine 
intervention options and begin preparing assistance programs.
A. Demographic Information 
This includes:
• tribes
• ages, and
• sex.
B. Characteristics of the Moves
Are people moving individually or by family, social groups, or 
villages?
C. Destinations
Are people moving back to their original community, nearby, or to 
an alternate site?
D. Numbers Returning 
The total number and:
• the percentage of the total population,
• the percentage of their ethnic group,
• the percentage of their community of residence (their displaced 
settlement).
E. Points of Departure
Are they leaving from the capital, towns in the transitional zone, 
from the agricultural schemes or from traditional migration areas?
87
F. Expectations
What are the people’s expectations about their journey and what will 
they find at their destination?
G. Ricochet Returns
Are there significant numbers of people who immediately leave the 
areas after reaching their destination? If so, where do they go?
H. Seasonal Aspects
Are returns affected by season? Specifically, is there a relationship 
between return and rains or agricultural seasons? Are the returns 
likely to stop once the rains come?
I. Impact
Does repatriation result in an increase or decrease in tensions in the 
area? Is there increased competition for scarce resources such as 
water? Have localized conflicts resulted as a result of the return?
J. Monitoring
After people have reached their destination, it will be imperative to 
monitor their progress and the security situation. Among the items 
that are important to watch are:
* Conscription/Recruitment: Sudden halts in spontaneous
repatriation are usually linked to recruitment or conscription by 
government or insurgent forces. A key role for the UN is to 
reach agreement with both sides that returnees not be forced into 
military service. Efforts should also be made to ensure that 
returnees are not forced to participate in collective security 
arrangements such as civil guards, local militia, etc., in their 
communities.
* Role of Government: Assistance to returnees should be provided 
by NGOs or the ICRC as much as possible. The government
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should only be involved in returning groups that are pro­
government. Any tribal group that could be considered to be 
sympathetic with insurgents should be assisted by the 
international community or other neutral bodies.


